Why Criminal Culpability Should Follow the Critical Path: Reframing the Theory of  Effective Control by Newton, Michael A. & Kuhlman, Casey
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2010
Why Criminal Culpability Should Follow the
Critical Path: Reframing the Theory of "Effective
Control"
Michael A. Newton
Casey Kuhlman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael A. Newton and Casey Kuhlman, Why Criminal Culpability Should Follow the Critical Path: Reframing the Theory of "Effective
Control", 40 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. 3 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/644
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588247
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Public Law and Legal Theory 
 
Working Paper Number 10 -17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why Criminal Culpability Should Follow the Critical Path:   
Reframing the Theory of ‘Effective Control’ 
 
 
 
Michael A. Newton 
Vanderbilt University Law School 
 
Casey Kuhlman 
Public International Law & Policy Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the 
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http:/ / ssrn.com/ abstract_id= 1588247  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588247
Theory of ‘effective control’ 3
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
Volume XL – 2009 – pp. 3–73 doi:10.1017/S0167676809000014
WHY CRIMINAL CULPABILITY SHOULD FOLLOW THE CRITICAL
PATH: REFRAMING THE THEORY OF ‘EFFECTIVE CONTROL’1
Michael A. Newton2 and Casey Kuhlman3
1. Introduction
2. Framing the problem
3. An abbreviated history of command/superior responsibility
3.1 Post WWII jurisprudence
3.2 The Post World War II treaty regime
4. Lex lata of superior responsibility
5. Further evidence of a pending problem
5.1 Atrocity by connivance: the jurisprudential conflict
5.2 Recent applications
5.2.1 Musema
5.2.2 Ori
5.2.3 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
5.3 The deceptive expediency of Joint Criminal Enterprise
6. The organizational theory of atrocity
6.1 How to form a fighting organization
6.2 Training and corporate culture
6.3 Mission orders and the endstate
7. A Composite Theory of Command Responsibility
8. Conclusion
Abstract
1. © M.A. Newton and C. Kuhlman, 2010.
2. Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School, See<http://law.vanderbilt.
edu/newton>. Any errors and omissions in this article are solely attributable to the authors.
3. Chief of Mission, Public International Law & Policy Group.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588247
4 M.A. Newton and C. Kuhlman
1. INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudential conception of effective control is rooted in outmoded concep-
tions of hierarchical organizational structure. By extension, the current template
for evaluating effective control poses an increasing risk that culpable commanders
will escape liability by exploiting the lacunae in current case law. This article pro-
poses that jurists should analyze command/superior responsibility cases with full
cognizance of modern command and control theory in order to sustain its viability
as a practical prosecutorial tool to regulate the crimes committed by loosely knit
groups and non-state actors conducting atrocities in chaotic circumstances. The
Composite Theory proposed herein would support liability for the acts of subordi-
nates on the theory that commanders who field fighting organizations without the
proper methods for enforcing compliance with the laws and customs of war as-
sume the risk of criminal sanction where criminal violations occur by their subor-
dinates, regardless of the nature of the organization.
Despite its broad acceptance and frequent regurgitation in jurisprudence, the
doctrine of effective control drawn from the essence of the leader’s authority is
increasingly inapplicable to non-state actors who conduct hostilities in non-tradi-
tional conflicts. The independent emergence of the principle that the commander’s
orders operate with the force of law to limit the application of violence in widely
disparate cultures and historical periods suggests that it is more than just a legal
technicality, but instead is fundamental to the nature of warfare itself. Command-
ers have the most at stake in the success of the mission both personally and profes-
sionally. Military forces operating under the sovereign authority of states around
the world are almost uniformly bound by domestic statutes that assign criminal
liability to commanders based on the incorporation of crimes defined by interna-
tional law into the domestic criminal code of the state.4 On the other hand, perpe-
4. See J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law,
International Committee of the Red Cross, Vol. II: Practice (Cambridge, CUP 2005) pp. 3718-3722,
3745-3751; enumerating examples of national legislation providing for command responsibility for
violations of international humanitarian law from: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Belgium, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Estonia, France,
Germany, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Russia, Rwanda,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United States, and Yemen. Most examples in the ICRC study
that are drawn from the period following the drafting of the Rome Statute adopt language from the
Rome Statute: e.g., the German Law Introducing the International Crimes Code (2002). Ibid., at
p. 3748. Examples from the ICRC study that illustrate the clear incorporation of international norms
prior to the date of the Rome Statute include: Bangladesh, International Crimes (Tribunal) Act (1973)
§ 4(2): ‘Any commander or superior officer … who fails or omits to discharge his duty to maintain
discipline, or to control or supervise the actions of persons under his command or his subordinates,
whereby such persons commit any [humanitarian crimes as recognized under international law], or
who fails to take necessary measures to prevent the commission of such crimes, is guilty of such
crimes’; Luxembourg, Law on the Punishment of Grave Breaches (1985) Art. 6: ‘the following may
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trators who commit war crimes in the context of non-state military and para-mili-
tary organizations are not bound by the same formalized military codes and regula-
tions applicable to professionalized state actors. Thus, the jurisprudential focus on
the ability of the superior to exercise punitive authority over the subordinate is
increasingly misplaced. Is the law currently situated such that a rebel warlord, a
terrorist leader or an outsourced intelligence operator evades superior responsibil-
ity simply because of how his fighting organization is structured or by the manner
in which communications flow in a decentralized organization? If the theory of
command responsibility is not rehabilitated, it will atrophy, and the answer will be
yes.
The concept of the commander’s legal responsibility became embedded in the
positivist law of international treaties for the first time in the 1907 Hague Regula-
tions.5 The formalization of the principle of command responsibility was in a sense
superfluous because the absence of any kind of organizing authority makes the
conduct of effective hostilities something of an oxymoron. State practice has since
integrated superior responsibility as a viable form of individual criminal responsi-
bility for offenses committed by subordinates and for which the authority figure
failed to take remedial or preventive.6 The ICRC notes that it is ‘uncontroversial’
that this long-standing rule applies to both international and non-international con-
flicts.7 The implicit conclusion is that there can be no armed force without the
organizing and centralizing influence of a responsible leader, who by definition is
empowered to exercise control over the conduct of hostilities. This principle marks
the difference between an organized force and an anarchic mob of criminals. Thus,
the very act of organizing an armed force and using it to perpetrate criminal acts
should be the sina qua non of command responsibility. Non state actors who do so
be charged, according to the circumstances, as co-authors or as accomplices in the crimes [of grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions]: superiors in rank who have tolerated the criminal activi-
ties of their subordinates …’; Sweden, Penal Code as amended (1962) Ch. 22, § 6: ‘if a crime against
international law has been committed by a member of the armed forces, his lawful superior shall also
be sentenced in so far as he was able to foresee the crime but failed to perform his duty to prevent it’.
Ibid., pp. 3746, 3749, 3751.
5. See Annex IV to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Art. 3 1907 entered into force 26 January 1910, reprinted in A. Roberts and R. Guelff, eds.,
Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd edn. (Oxford, OUP 2000) p. 73: ‘A belligerent party which vio-
lates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.
It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.’
6. J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law,
International Committee of the Red Cross Volume I: Rules, (Cambridge, CUP 2005) p. 558: ‘Rule 153:
Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war crimes committed by their subor-
dinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that the subordinates were about to commit or were
committing such crimes and did not take all necessary and reasonable measures in their power to
prevent their commission, or if such crimes had been committed, to punish the persons responsible.’
7. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 4, pp. 559-560.
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should be responsible for the crimes committed by units operating under their loose
authority because state practice accepts that the principles of command responsi-
bility that originated in highly organized and disciplined forces apply mutatis
mutandis to non-state actors.
The basis for this conception of command accountability is as old as war itself.
The laws and customs of war originated from the quest for commanders to incul-
cate a disciplined professionalism that facilitated the accomplishment of a military
mission. As early as 500 B.C., Sun Tzu wrote that commanders have a duty to
ensure that their subordinates conduct themselves in a civilized manner during
armed conflict.8 Writing in 1625, Hugo Grotius documented the Roman practice
that ‘it is not right for one who is not a soldier to fight with an enemy’, because
‘one who had fought an enemy outside the ranks and without the command of the
general was understood to have disobeyed orders’, which offense ‘should be pun-
ished with death’.9 The law of armed conflict developed as a restraining and hu-
manizing necessity to facilitate commanders’ ability to accomplish the military
mission even in the midst of fear, moral ambiguity, and horrific scenes of vio-
lence.10 The independent emergence of the principle that the commander’s orders
operate with the force of law to limit the application of violence in widely dispa-
rate cultures and historical periods suggests that it is more than just a legal techni-
cality, but instead is fundamental to the nature of warfare itself.
The responsibility of commanders is a necessary implication of the command
relationship, independent of the geographical context or the inter-sovereign nature
of the hostilities. Hence, it was no accident that the legal right to conduct hostilities
was premised on the command of a ‘person responsible for his subordinates’.11
8. Brandy Womack, ‘The Development and Recent Application of the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility: With Particular Reference to the Mens Rea Requirement’, 1 International Crime and
Punishment: Selected Issues (2003) pp. 101, 113.
9. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) Vol. III, Chap. XIIX, at <http://www.lonang.com/
exlibris/grotius/gro-318.htm>. Grotius explained the necessity for such rigid discipline as follows:
‘The reason is that, if such disobedience were rashly permitted, either the outposts might be aban-
doned, or, with the increase of lawlessness, the army or a part of it might even become involved in ill-
considered battles, a condition which ought absolutely to be avoided.’
10. See D. Schindler and J. Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conven-
tions, Resolutions, and Other Documents, 3rd edn (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1988) vii.
11. See Annex IV to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Art. 1 1907 entered into force 26 January 1910, supra n. 5 (which mirrors the language of Art. 1
of the 1899): ‘[t]he armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combat-
ants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war’, The
Hague Regulations embodied this legal regime as follows: Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of
war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 2. To have a fixed distinctive em-
blem recognizable at a distance; 3. To carry arms openly; and 4. To conduct their operations in accord-
ance with the laws and customs of war. In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the
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The conceptual basis of the laws and customs of war as deriving from the unyield-
ing demands of military discipline under the authority of the commander or king
whose orders must be obeyed explains the later development that the right to con-
duct hostilities as a lawful combatant was restricted to those under the authority of
a sovereign state.12 As a logical corollary, the US Supreme Court found in 1946,
‘the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control
of the operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for
their subordinates’.13 The responsibility of commanders is a necessary implication
of the command relationship, independent of the geographical context or the inter-
sovereign nature of the hostilities. In effect, the laws and customs of war form the
professional ethos that can fulfill their intended purposes only where commanders
bear operational and legal responsibility. Extrapolating this principle to the law
applicable in non-international armed conflicts,14 the ICTY panel in Hadzihasanovic
reached the same conclusion, finding command responsibility inherent in the thresh-
old requirement of a ‘responsible command’.15
In contrast to most criminal statutes that lay out the required elements begin-
ning with the actus reus and mens rea, a conviction based on a theory of command
responsibility begins with the predicate finding that is wholly circumstantial: the
army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination ‘army’. For a side by side compari-
son of the evolution from the 1899 language to the 1907 multilateral text, see J.B. Scott, ed., The
Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, 3rd edn. (New York, Oxford University
Press 1918) pp. 100-127.
12. This statement is true subject to the linguistic oddity introduced by Article 3 of the 1907
Hague Regulations, which makes clear that the armed forces of a state can include both combatants
and non-combatants (meaning chaplains and medical personnel), and that both classes of military
personnel are entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra n. 5,
Art. 3: ‘[t]he armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In
the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.’
13. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
14. The legal term derives from Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions – ‘Armed
conflicts not of an international character.’ The specific law applicable to non-international armed
conflicts has been expanded and refined in the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, as well as other relevant treaties such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Art. 8. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.557 (2006), a fractured United States Supreme Court
found in dicta that the armed conflict between Al Qaeda and the United States constitutes a conflict
governed by the norms of Common Article 3 as a matter of treaty law. Hamdan at 2790. The Israeli
Supreme Court, on the other hand, determined that the conflict between Israel and terrorist fighters
constitutes an international armed conflict because it ‘crosses the borders of the state.’ This conclusion
is unsupported by any example of state practice and represents the only example in which the legal
character of a conflict has been made by reference to the geographic boundary rather than the identity
of the participants. Pub. Comm. against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel, HCJ 769/02, para. 18, at
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.
15. Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanovi , Case No. IT-01-47, Decision on Interlocutoy Appeal Chal-
lenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, paras. 15-18.
8 M.A. Newton and C. Kuhlman
existence of a superior / subordinate relationship between the defendant and the
direct perpetrator(s) of a serious crime. Because command responsibility is in-
tended to apply in situations where the accused holds a hierarchically superior
relationship over the perpetrator(s), it is typically charged in situations in which
the command structure is discernible.16 The existence of such a relationship is a
threshold issue which, if unproven, precludes a court from considering the remain-
ing elements of the substantive offenses. Recognizing that there exists a practical
limit below which a superior does not have enough influence over a subordinate to
be logically responsible for that subordinate’s actions, courts have developed the
concept of effective control as the test of the sufficiency of this relationship.17 Com-
mand authority that falls short of effective control is insufficient to support crimi-
nal accountability.18 The ICTY has explained that ‘[t]he indicators of effective
control are more a matter of evidence than of substantive law’, and must show that
the superior had the power to prevent or punish the perpetrators, or to refer their
actions to the appropriate authorities.19 Similarly, though it springs from the same
conceptual soil, civilian superiors can be held liable for the acts of subordinates
despite that fact that ‘[C]ivilian leaders need not be vested with prerogatives simi-
lar to those of military commanders in order to incur such responsibility under
Article 6(3) of the Statute: it suffices that the superior had effective control of his
subordinates, that is, that he had the material capacity to prevent or punish the
criminal conduct of subordinates. For the same reasons, it does not have to be
established that the civilian superior was vested with ‘excessive powers’ similar to
those of public authorities.’20
16. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judge-
ment, 22 February 2001, para. 396: ‘A superior-subordinate relationship must exist for the recognition
of [CR]. However, such a relationship cannot be determined by reference to formal status alone. Ac-
cordingly, formal designation as a commander is not necessary for establishing command responsibil-
ity, as such responsibility may be recognised by virtue of a person’s de facto, as well as de jure,
position as a commander.’
17. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Trial Chamber Judgement, 20 February 2001, para.
256.
18. Ibid., at paras. 258-266.
19. Prosecutor v. Blaški , Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Chamber Judgement, 29 July 2004, para.
69. See also Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber Judgement,
1 September 2004, para. 276: ‘A Superior vested with de jure authority who does not actually have
effective control over his or her subordinates would not incur criminal responsibility pursuant to the
doctrine of superior responsibility; whereas a de facto superior who lacks formal letters of appoint-
ment or commission but does, in reality, have effective control over the perpetrators of the offenses
might incur criminal responsibility.’
20. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. 99-52-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement,
28 November 2007, para. 785. See also para. 605: ‘[T]he case-law of the ad hoc Tribunals affirms that
there is no requirement that the de jure or de facto control exercised by a civilian superior must be of
the same nature as that exercised by a military commander in order to incur superior responsibility:
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Nevertheless, current applications of the doctrine may allow non-state actors to
escape criminal culpability because the judicially created evidentiary tests and
understandings have become unwieldy and often inapplicable. Those who should
factually face criminal culpability are increasingly sheltered by legal technicality
in the evidence assessed by courts to determine effective control. To be more pre-
cise, courts are construing the doctrine of effective control through a formulaic
filter that makes convictions increasingly difficult. The principles of command re-
sponsibility [and its counterpart applicable to civilian superiors]21 should be recon-
ceptualized to focus criminal responsibility more squarely on individuals based
solely on their role in forcing followers to participate in conflicts. The superior
who organizes that application of violence is morally responsible for the resulting
carnage, and should face accompanying legal responsibility.
Section 2 describes in greater detail the growing disconnect between the judi-
cial theory and the operational realities that this article seeks to address, while
Section 3 reviews the current jurisprudential baseline. Section 4 analyzes the rel-
evant treaty law that provides the framework from which the current jurisprudence
evolved, and which serves as the platform for further evolution of the principle of
effective control. Section 5 takes a closer examination of three recent cases that are
representative of how conflicts are likely to unfold in the foreseeable future. Sec-
tion 6 briefly highlights the organizational and psychological constraints that are
the necessary predicate for the conduct of hostilities and relates them to the norma-
tive framework supporting the judicial application of command responsibility.
The penultimate part provides practitioners with a coherent theory of superior
responsibility appropriate to the evolving face of modern conflicts and more re-
flective of the inherent nature of authentic command. The Composite Theory pro-
posed in Section 7 represents a vital reframing of existing law that would have
far-reaching implications in theory and practice. Prosecutorial trends toward charging
joint criminal enterprises and other new theories of individual responsibility fail to
understand the essence of the criminality at issue for all fighting organizations –
that it is the fielding of the fighting organization without the proper safeguards that
in many cases is the causal factor for mass atrocities.
every civilian superior exercising effective control over his subordinates, that is, having the material
ability to prevent or punish the subordinates’ criminal conduct, can be held responsible under Art. 6(3)
of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber further considers it worth recalling that “it is appropriate to
assess on a case-by-case basis the power of authority actually devolved upon the Accused in order to
determine whether or not he had the power to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
commission of the alleged crimes or to punish the perpetrators thereof”.’
21. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgement, 2 September 1998, para. 148: ‘The
Chamber finds that the definition of individual criminal responsibility, as provided under Art. 6(3) of
the Statute, applies not only to the military but also to persons exercising civilian authority as superi-
ors.’
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In contrast, the Theory proposed herein would support liability for the acts of
subordinates on the grounds that commanders who field fighting organizations
without the proper methods for enforcing compliance with the laws and customs of
war assume the risk of criminal sanction where criminal violations occur by their
subordinates, regardless of the nature of the organization. In other words, a modern
understanding of effective control imputes responsibility to any commander/civil-
ian superior who organizes a collective entity with the intent of conducting hostili-
ties and thereafter fails to create a climate of compliance with the laws and customs
of war. This approach will permit the extension of liability to commanders who
organize cellular units that operate on the basis of primary loyalty to a local leader
and with little/no tactical control by the hierarchy, such as the tactics seen in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and a number of modern non-international armed conflicts.
2. FRAMING THE PROBLEM
The very existence of superior responsibility as a form of vicarious liability is
predicated on the necessity for controlling the lethal application of violence. Thus,
the criminal responsibility of commanders and others in authority is ‘ultimately
predicated upon the power of the superior to control the acts of his subordinates. A
duty is placed upon the superior to exercise this power so as to prevent and repress
the crimes committed by his subordinates, and a failure by him to do so in a dili-
gent manner is sanctioned by the imposition of individual criminal responsibility
in accordance with the doctrine.’22 The genesis of superior responsibility is there-
fore grounded in the notion that commanders on the battlefield are most properly
vested with the primary enforcement of the laws and customs of war. This is sup-
ported by the normative notion that those who are responsible for releasing the
violence are those individuals who should control the violence and by the prag-
matic notion that commanders on the battlefield who control their fighters are in
reality the only individuals who will be able to suppress violations of the laws of
war either proactively by proper training or reactively by proper disciplining. As
such, the person responsible for coordinating the violence, i.e., the commander (or
civilian superior) has always been closely aligned with operational realities that
22. elibi i Trial Judgement, paras. 340, 377 (The Delali  case was the first was the first litiga-
tion to involve superior responsibility since World War II and resulted in the acquittal of Zejnil Delali
who had been charged with 11counts of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and violation
of the laws and customs of war on the basis of his alleged command over the elebi i prison-camp at
the relevant time. The Trial Chamber found that Mr. Delali  did not have command and control over
the elebi i prison-camp and over the guards who worked there, such as to entail his criminal respon-
sibility for their actions.); see also Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,
Trial Chamber Judgement, 21 May 1999, para. 202.
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the fighters are actually experiencing. This reality warrants the consequential ca-
veat that the responsible leader also bears potential criminal liability for violations
committed by their subordinates.23 All three of these ideas have traditionally car-
ried the weight of compliance with the laws and customs of war by vesting com-
manders with the responsibility of compliance combined with the threat of criminal
sanction for a lack of compliance.
In contrast to the neatly delineated professionalized hierarchies under state con-
trol from which the precepts of command responsibility emerged, the modern bat-
tlefield is predominately a non-linear kaleidoscope of personalities orchestrating
non-traditional hostilities that frequently transcend national boundaries. Such non-
state organizations fight by training fighters and sending them in a general direc-
tion with little other coordination or consultation. Such groups frequently permit
the recruitment of child soldiers who are subject only to the authority of the on-
scene tactical leader. In many areas, war lords will control groups of fighters and
will switch allegiances rather than submit to a hierarchy of increasingly responsi-
ble authorities.
By systematizing chaos in this manner, a commander in many cases is indirectly
responsible for systematizing atrocities because the restraining influence of wiser
individuals who hold the respect of younger, impetuous persons is absent. This, of
course, is often the precise objective of the perpetrator. The modern jurisprudence
is clear that responsibility can be imputed irrespective of whether the effective
control derived from a de jure or a de facto position of authority.24 To be clear, the
development of a more flexible concept of de facto authority represented the juris-
prudential attempt to adjust to the evolution of armed conflict away from the west-
ernized hierarchical structures predominant in the past. However, the very structure
of decentralized fighting forces strongly mitigates the criminal responsibility of
superiors due in large part to their very organization and the absence of any formal
punitive mechanisms or even clear processes for transmitting orders in a hierarchi-
cal manner. 25 In fact, the very randomness of violence can, in itself, serve to terror-
23. See M.A. Newton, ‘Modern Military Necessity: The Role and Relevance of Military Law-
yers’, 12 Roger Williams University Law Review (2007) pp. 877, 885: ‘The modern law of armed
conflict is really nothing more than a web of interlocking protections and specific legal obligations
held together by the thread of respect for humankind and a reciprocal expectation that other partici-
pants in armed conflict are bound by the same normative constraints. In short, the law serves as the
firebreak between being a hero in the service of your nation and a criminal who brings disgrace to your
nation, dishonor to the unit, and disruption to the military mission.’
24. See infra nn. 69 to 81 and accompanying text.
25. M.J. Osiel, Obeying Orders (Piscataway NJ, Transaction Publishers 1999) pp. 173-199: dis-
cussing situations in which commanders can sometimes deliberately create the impression of having
‘unintentionally’ lost control of their troops, in order to evade responsibility for the latters’ miscon-
duct.
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ize the civilians which creates a perceived incentive on the part of the non-state
actor that random violence could lead to the political objectives of the organiza-
tion. When a commander institutes a corporate culture of violence unaccompanied
by restraint mechanisms that can properly channel the violence and suppress atroci-
ties (i.e., prevent and/or punish the commission of war crimes), the commander
should be subject to criminal sanction on the basis of that organization and
overarching authority alone.
In practice, some defendants exercising authority in non-traditional units have
escaped criminal responsibility because the ad hoc Tribunals have at times adopted
a rigid and highly technical approach to the law of superior responsibility.26 In light
of the reality that warfare is increasingly conducted by irregular forces, or domi-
nated by non-state actors, such as warlords, paramilitary elements and terrorists,
the precepts of command responsibility must evolve to ‘ensure continued compli-
ance with basic requirements of international humanitarian law’.27 However, if the
doctrine of ‘effective control’ is not reconceived in the jurisprudential landscape
and a rigid series of evidentiary factors ossifies there will be a very distinct en-
forcement gap. The simplest solution to the enforcement problems raised by the
emergence of non-state actors as a dominant feature in the campaigns of criminality
during modern conflicts is to adapt a universalized conception of superior respon-
sibility. In other words, courts should treat non-state actors with the heightened
responsibility attributable to the commanders in formalized military organizations
precisely because they bear primary responsibility for the initiation of violence. At
present, non-state actors are increasingly able to escape criminal sanction simply
by their mode of organization and control of their subordinates. Superior responsi-
bility must reclaim the flexibility to extend criminal sanction to all commanders
who fail to suppress atrocities and have the requisite mens rea.
Indeed, an extrapolation of current jurisprudential trends shows an uneven ap-
plication of the tenets in the context of non-state actors.28 A very simplified exam-
ple will illustrate this point. Country A insists on very stringent control of subordinate
units. This country is run by a dictator who insists on strident control of every
aspect of his society. Saddam Hussein, for example, interrupted a defense line of
argument that questioned whether formal control also constituted real control for
the purposes of imposing criminal responsibility for the acts of subordinates in and
around the town of al-Dujail by standing up in the dock and exclaiming that ‘[t]he
26. Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovi , Case No. IT-01-48-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 16 Octo-
ber 2007; Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishima, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement,
3 July 2002.
27. G. Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (Oxford, OUP 2009) p. 122.
28. Ibid., n. 26, pp. 163-171: concisely summarizing the wide range of evidentiary indicators and
often contradictory assertions used by various courts in assessing command culpability.
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Iraqi Army is without a single Iraqi plane that could fly without my order.’29 The
commander of our hypothetical country A has made it clear that he will retain
control of every man on the battlefield. If a subordinate ever loses radio contact he
has been given a standing order to stop fighting, to stop moving his unit and to
retreat to a place where he can regain contact with his superior. The tribunal estab-
lished to try all war crimes for this hypothetical nation, acting in good faith and
applying existing jurisprudence, would likely establish a multifactor test for as-
sessing whether the midlevel commander had effective control over his subordi-
nate units.
Under this scenario, the liability of the midlevel commander on trial for war
crimes perpetrated under a theory of command responsibility might well depend
almost entirely on whether he maintained radio contact with his subordinates at all
times, or at least on whether the alternate means of communication were available.
Where the court found that he did not maintain contact he would likely be deemed
to not have maintained effective control over his subordinates. While this may
seem to be a far-fetched example, the ICTR Appeals Chamber based its finding
that a political official exercised ‘de facto effective control over the Interahamwe
as a civilian’ in large part because the assailants ‘reported back daily to the Appel-
lant on what had been achieved.’ 30 While the concept of de facto authority is
intended by courts to provide a flexible template for case by case analysis, the facts
must demonstrate a sufficient linkage between the political or military official and
subordinates who commit a particular crime(s) in a particular place under particu-
lar circumstances. Such evidence may often be lacking, as in fact a number of ad
hoc tribunal cases have shown. In practice, non traditional actors may be set loose
under the express overall guidance of a non-state actor commander to conduct
uncoordinated atrocities and therefore enjoy impunity by falling completely through
the jurisprudential matrix.
Assuming that a contemporaneous conflict is underway in Country B, another
tribunal might well apply the same standard of assessing effective control in as-
sessing superior liability. Country B, on the other hand, is a very small, homog-
enous country. Its fighters come from a long line of warriors. Their fathers fought
alongside each other, their grandfathers fought alongside each other. The modern
fighters have known each other since birth and have played sports together their
29. M.A. Newton and M.P. Scharf, Enemy of the State: The Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein
(New York, St. Martin’s Press 2008) p. 168.
30. Juvénal Kajelijeli v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Appeals Chamber Judge-
ment, 23 May 2005, paras. 90-91: ‘upholding the conviction of the former Bourgmestre of Mukingo.
Kajelijeli was a member of MRND (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement)
and he was also a founder and leader of Interahamwe in the Mukingo commune from 1991 to 1994’, at
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/KAJELIJELI_ICTR-98-44A/KAJELIJELI_ICTR-98-
44A-A.html>.
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entire lives. They know each other so well that they make football passes blindly
because they always know where the other players will be. The authorities of Country
B use informal and often shifting lines of allegiance to control the actions of the
commanders in the conflict. At the same time, there is an undercurrent of mysti-
cism and belief in the spiritual unity of the tribe that serves to enforce obedience by
subordinates rather than any punishment authority vested in commanders. Country
B maintains that radio silence during operations is the ultimate manifestation of
unit cohesion, mutual trust, and operational camaraderie; indeed if a commander
used his radio during combat operations, it would be interpreted by others as a sign
either that that commander was too dense to understand the operation at hand or
did not trust his brothers in arms, either of which would bring a sanction of en-
forced social exile for life. A subsequent judicial evaluation of these actions would
be hard pressed to apply the same multifactor test developed over the years of
jurisprudence of its sister tribunal who was trying Country A. The midlevel com-
manders of Country B might well all be acquitted as Tribunal B routinely cited the
lack of radio contact between subordinates and the lack of a systematized basis for
enforcing discipline as indicia that there was no effective control over the acts of
subordinates.
The law of command responsibility should not be permitted to wither away into
textbook theory in the face of changing operational realities and asymmetric hos-
tilities conducted by non-state actors. Though many scholars, jurists and military
professionals have lamented the intellectual challenge of creating additional in-
centives for non-state actors to comply with the laws and customs of war,31 creat-
ing disincentives for commanders to retain tight and effective control over the crimes
committed by subordinates surely cannot advance the humanitarian principles of
the law. Doctrines of command and superior responsibility can retain utility as a
compliance inducing norms only if they remain aligned with the modern military
practices.
One potential solution to this modern dilemma may be to create a broadened
conceptual framework for individual responsibility. Indeed, some courts have im-
posed criminal liability simply based on the participation of the accused in an armed
militia acting with a common purpose, even though the credible evidence at trial
and the reasonable inferences to be drawn that evidence did not permit a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants participated directly or indirectly in
the charged offenses.32 Early ICC cases implicitly illustrate the challenge that this
31. See e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of
Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors’, 98 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology (2008) p. 711.
32. Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes v. Sisto Barros aka Xisto Barros and Cesar
Mendonca, The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Dili District Court, The Special Panels for Se-
rious Crimes, Case No. 0112004, 12 May 2005, para. 120 (copy on file with the authors).
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article seeks to address as the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chambers have displayed a
remarkable reticence to employ the doctrine of command responsibility against
non-state actors. In the Lubanga case, Pre-Trial Chamber I found that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the perpetrator founded the military organiza-
tion and served as its Commander-in-Chief throughout the relevant time period.
Remarkably, the provision of the Rome Statute applying the precepts of command
responsibility was avoided both by the Prosecution and the Pre-Trial Chamber de-
spite its patent applicability.33 In lieu of extending the principles of command ac-
countability onto a non-traditional, non-linear battlefield in which the commanders
utilized fluid mechanisms of control in the midst of rapidly evolving operations,
the Pre-Trial Chamber resorted to a theory of individual responsibility known as
‘co-perpetratorship.’ This development is even more notable given the recent re-
jection of the theory by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia on the basis that ‘co-perpetratorship’ as promulgated
by the Trial Chamber ‘does not have support in customary international law or in
the settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal.’34
It seems clear that the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC has strained to avoid invo-
cation of the precepts of command in favor of resuscitating an outmoded and ar-
cane theory. By applying Roxin’s organizational analysis drawn from the Eichmann
trial in 1962, the ICC generated a wholly new category of individual responsibility
in which both superiors and subordinates in military organizations are held respon-
sible as co-perpetrators, acting through an organizational apparatus.35 Such an ap-
proach even in cases where the evidence would otherwise support a finding of
effective control is a major shift from the precepts of individual responsibility that
embodies a regrettable ‘recollectivation of responsibility’36 because of the broader
33. W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3rd. edn. (Cambridge,
CUP 2007) pp. 212-213. See also Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8th July 2005 as
amended on 27 September 2005, ICC-02/04-01/05-53, at <http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc97185.PDF> (adopting the same theory of liability).
34. Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 22 March
2006, para. 62.
35. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, paras. 327-367, at <http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF>; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 Sep-
tember 2008, paras. 477-518; Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-
14-tENG para. 78 (incorporating Claus Roxin’s interpretation of the Eichmann judgement into
international jurisprudence and eschewing traditional principles of command responsibility).
36. See M. Sassoli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, Harvard
University Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Occasional Paper No. 6, 2006,
p. 36, ‘noting that a policy of imputing criminal responsibility to every member of the organization by
virtue of membership in an organization that participates in crimes creates a disincentive to compli-
ance with international humanitarian law that “should be avoided”. Sassoli points out that it “remains
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conception of the entire military organization as a unified criminal activity. Moreo-
ver, the Roxin theory ‘assumes the existence of a rigidly formal bureaucracy’ pat-
terned on the model of the Prussian organizational model in which authority is
channeled into defined hierarchical structures in which compliance is assured based
on uniformity of expectations and goals.37 The twin ironies of the ICC approach
are that the ICC has melded Roxin’s theory into a non-linear battlefield that oper-
ates in precisely the opposite manner as a westernized military hierarchy; secondly
the ill fated marriage, almost by definition, helps ensure acquittal of the perpetra-
tors because defense counsel need only demonstrate a lack of power ‘to replace
sullen juniors with more enthusiastic drones’.38
Finally, the current ICC approach is likely to prove irreducibly flawed in the end
because any organization united under the authority of a superior will, by defini-
tion, exist with a common purpose. That is the very essence of authority and com-
mand. In the abstract, the law is clear that superiors cannot be convicted on the
basis of strict liability by virtue of their position alone.39 The pathway chosen by
the ICC endangers the foundations of individual responsibility because superim-
posing an extended version of joint responsibility onto a non-state organizational
structure leads to a system of strict liability, and simultaneously creates corresponding
uncertainty regarding the appropriate scope of liability under established theories
of JCE theory in the absence of an organized military structure.
Though ad hoc readjustments of theories of the theories of individual responsi-
bility may provide a result oriented mechanism for affixing criminal responsibility,
they fail to understand the essence of the criminality at issue for all fighting organi-
zations – that it is the fielding of the fighting organization without the proper safe-
guards that is the root of the criminal behavior. Any military or para-military
organization seeks to use ‘deliberate, controlled, and purposeful acts of force com-
bined and harmonized to attain what are ultimately political objectives’.40 Given
of utmost importance to be able to reward the armed group member who respects IHL in order to
increase our ability to encourage compliance with IHL and, thus, protect victims”.’
37. M. Osiel, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge, CUP 2009) p. 100.
38. Ibid., at p. 101.
39. Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-87-20-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 15 May
2003, para. 404, at <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Semanza/judgement/1.htm>: ‘Criminal li-
ability based on superior responsibility will not attach on the basis of strict liability simply because an
individual is in a chain of command with authority over a given geographic area. While the individu-
al’s position in the command hierarchy is considered a significant indicator that the superior knew or
had reason to know about the actions of his subordinates, knowledge will not be presumed from the
status alone.’
40. M. Howard, ‘Temperamenta Belli: CanWar Be Controlled?’, in M. Howard, ed. Restraints on
War (Oxford, OUP 1979). D. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport
CT, Praeger Security International 2006) p. 12; ‘The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more
than simply making trouble is an attractive cause, particularly in view of the risks involved and in view
Theory of ‘effective control’ 17
that reality, a ‘highly articulated structure of control’ is necessary, even in insur-
gencies or guerilla operations, to prevent purposeless and indiscriminate violence
that in effect detracts from the larger political purpose of the conflict.41 Interna-
tional law therefore places a heightened responsibility on commanders who field a
fighting organization and requires that they do so at their own risk.
This article postulates a much-needed reconceptualization of the concept of
effective control that will sustain prosecution and conviction of the perpetrators
responsible for the majority of atrocity crimes in the modern world. Compliance
with the laws and customs of war is the raison d’etre for the ‘effective control’
framework, and the potential for its increasing obsolescence ought to invigorate
exploration of viable theories for preserving its utility as a potential deterrent to
criminal acts during conflict. Without the proper internal enforcement of the laws
and customs of warfare, the commander becomes liable to external enforcement.
Hence, it follows that commanders [or civilian superiors] who organize forces and
initiate campaigns of atrocity against civilized society should face punishment for
the misuse of their authority. Such a refocused conception of the principles of
command responsibility will reinforce the tenet that authority must be used to pre-
vent atrocity in order to validate its proper purpose.
3. AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY OF COMMAND/SUPERIOR
RESPONSIBILITY
The doctrine of superior responsibility flows from the very nature of the laws and
customs of war. Historically and legally, the entire conception of military struc-
tures around the world is premised on some sort of hierarchical notion, which
explains why the principle of Unity of Command emerged as one of the universally
recognized Principles of War.42 Commanders have the most at stake in the success
of the mission both personally and professionally. The legal norms define the bound-
ary between being welcomed as a hero in the service of your nation and being
relegated to a lifetime of castigation as an internationally condemned criminal sub-
ject to the universalized jurisdiction of states across the globe. The Great Swedish
King and soldier, Gustavus Adolphus recognized this essential truth with the man-
of the fact that the early supporters and the active supporters – not necessarily the same- have to be
recruited by persuasion. With a cause, the insurgent has a formidable, if intangible, asset that he can
progressively transform into concrete strength.’
41. Ibid.
42. The Principles of War crystallized as military doctrine around the world around 1800. The
accepted principles are: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Forces, Maneuver, Unity of Com-
mand, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. J. Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., The Oxford Companion to
American Military History (Oxford, OUP 1999) p. 557.
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date during the 100 Years’ War that ‘no Colonel or Captain shall command his
soldiers to do any unlawful thing; which so does, shall be punished according to
the discretion of the Judge’.43
Commanders must command, and their failure to control the acts of their subor-
dinates creates indiscipline that undermines the military mission as well as the
professional ethos of the units. Compare Charles VII of France’s declaration in
1439 to the modern doctrine as described in the next section of this article:
‘The king orders that each captain or lieutenant be held responsible for the abuses, ills
and offenses committed by members of his company, and that as soon as he receives
any complaint concerning any such misdeed or abuse, he bring the offender to justice
so that the said offender be punished in a manner commensurate with his offence, ac-
cording these Ordinances. If he fails to do so or covers up the misdeed or delays tak-
ing action, or if, because of his negligence or otherwise, the offender escapes and thus
evades punishment, the captain shall be deemed responsible for the offense as if he
had committed it himself and shall be punished in the same way as the offender would
have.’44
The concept of the commander’s legal responsible became embedded in the posi-
tivist law of international treaties for the first time in the 1907 Hague Regula-
tions.45 The formalization of the principle of command responsibility was in a sense
superfluous because the absence of any kind of organizing authority makes the
conduct of effective hostilities something of an oxymoron. State practice has since
integrated superior responsibility as a viable form of individual criminal responsi-
bility for offenses committed by subordinates and for which the authority figure
failed to take remedial or preventive.46 The ICRC notes that it is ‘uncontroversial’
that this long-standing rule applies to both international and non-international con-
flicts.47 The scope of the duty, as defined by state practice, is on its face extraordi-
43. G. Adolphus, ‘Articles of Military Laws to be Observed in the Wars (1621)’, quoted in
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 2nd edn. (The Hague,
Kluwer 1999) p. 59. The 150 Articles regulating military conduct were a groundbreaking attempt to
establish a professional code grounded in legal formulations and were promulgated as Swedish forces
moved toward battle with Russian forces.
44. Quoted in M.L. Smidt, ‘Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Con-
temporary Military Operations’, 164 Mil. LR (2000) p. 155, n. 55.
45. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra n. 5, Art. 3, ‘A belligerent party which violates the provisions
of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsi-
ble for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.’
46. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra n. 4, p. 558, ‘Rule 153: Commanders and other superi-
ors are criminally responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates if they knew, or had
reason to know, that the subordinates were about to commit or were committing such crimes and did
not take all necessary and reasonable measures in their power to prevent their commission, or if such
crimes had been committed, to punish the persons responsible.’
47. Ibid., pp. 559-560.
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narily broad: of the 42 military manuals or state legislation excerpted in the ICRC
Customary International Humanitarian Law study only 6 had any effective control
language: France, Britain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Germany, and five more
had some sort of a scope of command requirement.48
The implicit conclusion is that there can be no armed force without the organiz-
ing and centralizing influence of a responsible leader, who by definition is empow-
ered to exercise control over the conduct of hostilities. This principle marks the
difference between an organized force and an anarchic mob of criminals. Thus, the
very act of organizing an armed force and using it to perpetrate criminal acts is the
sina qua non of command responsibility. Non state actors who do so should be
responsible for the crimes committed by units operating under their loose authority
because state practice accepts that the principles of command responsibility that
originated in highly organized and disciplined forces apply mutatis mutandis to
non-state actors.
3.1 Post WWII Jurisprudence
Although the doctrine of superior responsibility was not encapsulated in the Lon-
don Charter, the Far East Charters or Control Council Law No. 10, it was devel-
oped in the case law of the tribunals and applied both to individuals with formal
military authority and to civilian officials who exercised authority over military
operations.49 Similar to modern tribunal case law, the post-WWII tribunals seemed
to struggle with two issues: (1) how much notice is sufficient notice that a criminal
intention may properly be inferred, and (2) which subordinate perpetrators may be
imputed to the superior?
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg implicitly relied on the doc-
trine of command responsibility in prosecuting several civilian officers. In the case
of Wilhelm Frick, Nazi Germany’s Minister of the Interior, the Nuremberg tribu-
nal’s judgment rested on the determination that Frick knew of the systematic mur-
der of mentally handicapped and sick people, disregarded complaints regarding
these crimes, and allowed them to continue.50 Likewise, the tribunal found that
Fritz Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labor, had been
aware of and supported the slave labor program employed by the Nazis.51 Despite
48. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 3738-3751.
49. Prosecutor v. Kordi  and erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Judgement, paras. 419-424; Prosecu-
tor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgement, 2 September 1998, para. 148, ‘The Cham-
ber finds that the definition of individual criminal responsibility, as provided under Art. 6(3) of the
Statute, applies not only to the military but also to persons exercising civilian authority as superiors’.
50. Judgement against Wilhelm Frick, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judfrick.htm>.
51. Judgement against Fritz Sauckel, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal, at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judsauck.htm>.
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Sauckel’s claim that he had not been responsible for the way the slave laborers
were obtained and treated, the tribunal found that he had overall responsibility for
the slave labor program and was aware and vigorously supported the ruthless meth-
ods that were used to obtain laborers.52 The Frick and Sauckel decisions accepted
the proposition that nullem crimen sine lege supported liability over even civilian
officials whose authority promulgated and sustained subsequent criminal acts com-
mitted by subordinates.53
In the High Command case the trial chamber struggled to define the scope of
offenses imputable to the superior:
‘Military subordination is a comprehensive but not conclusive factor in fixing criminal
responsibility … A high commander cannot keep completely informed of the details
of military operations of subordinates … There must be a personal dereliction. That
can only occur where the act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to prop-
erly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter
case, it must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the
action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence … Modern war entails a large
measure of decentralization. A high commander cannot keep completely informed of
the details of military operations of subordinates … He has a right to assume that de-
tails entrusted to responsible subordinates will be legally executed … Criminal acts
committed by those forces cannot in themselves be charged to him on the theory of
subordination.’54
Likewise, The Hostages case forced the trial chamber to struggle with the notice
element:
‘We desire to point out that the German Wehrmacht was a well equipped, well trained
and well disciplined army … The evidence shows … that they were led by competent
commanders who had mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, and courier service for the
handling of communications. Reports were made daily, sometimes morning and
52. Ibid.
53. As described, Frick and Sauckel were both civilian officials. Additionally, the Nuremberg
statute provided that command responsibility could not be avoided by reference to holding an official
government position. Stating that: ‘[t]he official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from re-
sponsibility or mitigating punishment’, the statute eliminated an important potential defense to com-
mand responsibility. Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Annex (known as the London
Charter), 8 August 1945, Art. 7, at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp>.
54. United States v. Von Leeb, 11 TWC (1948) p. 543; and 12 Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals, pp. 1, 73-76, (High Command).
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evening … Any army commander will not ordinarily be permitted to deny knowledge
of reports received at his headquarters, they being sent there for his special benefit …
It would strain the credulity of the Tribunal to believe that a high ranking military
commander would permit himself to get out of touch with current happenings in the
area of his command during wartime.’55
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal) also ap-
plied the doctrine of command responsibility to political leaders. In the case of
Kuniaki Koiso, who became Prime Minister of Japan in 1944, the tribunal found
that Koiso must have known of crimes committed by Japanese troops simply be-
cause these crimes were so widespread and infamous.56 Moreover, Koiso had at-
tended a meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War at which the
Foreign Minister requested the issuance of a directive to stop the mistreatment of
prisoners of war.57 Despite these clear indications that Japanese troops committed
war crimes, Koiso took no action, which led the tribunal to find ‘a deliberate disre-
gard of his duty’.58 This judgment required that superiors – including civilian lead-
ers such as Koiso – are under a duty to intervene against crimes committed by
subordinates, the key premise of command responsibility.
These cases began to craft the contours of what later became the modern doc-
trine of superior responsibility; the Yamashita case is the true genesis of the mod-
ern conception of the normative idea that a commander assumes affirmative
responsibility to control subordinates. The United States Supreme Court succinctly
(and not without some controversy) summarized the legal question at issue at hand:
‘[T]he gist of the charge is an unlawful breach of duty by petitioner as an army com-
mander to control the operations of the members of his command by ‘permitting them
to commit’ the extensive and widespread atrocities specified. The question then is
whether the law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such appropri-
ate measures as are within his power to control the troops under his command for the
prevention of the specified acts which are violations of the law of war and which are
likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and
55. List at 11 Trials of War Criminals pp. 757, 1256, (Hostage Case). 11 TWC (1948) pp. 757,
1259-1260.
56. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, reprinted in L.
Friedman, ed., The Law of War: A Documentary History, Vol. II (Westport CT, Greenwood Press
1972) p. 1141; the tribunal finding that: ‘When Koiso became Prime Minister in 1944 atrocities and
other war crimes being committed by the Japanese troops in every theater of war had become so
notorious that it is improbable that a man in Koiso’s position would not have been well-informed [of
them].’
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
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whether he may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure to take such
measures when violations result.’59
The Court held that once the jus in bello is applicable at the onset of armed con-
flict, then the commander on both sides of the battlefield is under an affirmative
obligation to ‘take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances’ to uphold and enforce the laws.60 The requirement for actual or
constructive notice was subsequently endorsed by the US Military Tribunals at
Nuremberg convened under Control Council Law 10.61 The baseline for the entire
doctrine, which later took on the force of treaty law, is that both pillars of the jus in
bello at the time – both the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions –
required that the individual responsible for the enforcement of those norms was to
be the military commander.
3.2 The Post World War II treaty regime
The 1949 Geneva Conventions did not expressly outline the parameters of the
doctrine of superior responsibility, though as noted above the requirement of a
commander was an essential requirement for the recognition of combatant status
for irregular forces. The ICRC convened a conference of government lawyers in
1971 an 1972 to consider two draft Protocols ostensibly designed to ‘reaffirm and
develop’ the corpus of the laws and customs of war.62 Article 43 of the 1977 Addi-
59. 327 US 1, 14-15; Endorsing the same normative baseline that resonated through the centuries
of military organization, the Court concluded that: ‘It is evident that the conduct of military operations
by troops whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their commander would almost
certainly result in violations which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose to protect
civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of
an invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection. Hence
the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the operations of
war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates … These provisions
[The Hague and Geneva Laws] plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time specified was military
governor of the Philippines, as well as commander of the Japanese forces, an affirmative duty to take
such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of
war and the civilian population. This duty of a commanding officer has heretofore been recognized,
and its breach penalized by our own military tribunals…
60. 327 US 1, 16 n. 3.
61. See e.g., Trial of Field Marshal Erhard Milch quoted in Law Reports of Trials of War Crimi-
nals, United Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 21, Trial of General Yamashita, Notes on the
Case (hereinafter Notes on Yamashita); ‘But certainly he had no opportunity to prevent or stop, unless
it can be found that he had guilty knowledge of them, a fact which has already been determined in the
negative … In view of the above findings, it is obvious that the defendant never became particeps
crimenis and accessory in the low-pressure experiments set forth in the second count of the indict-
ment.’
62. Roberts and Guelff, supra n. 5.
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tional Protocol I added an affirmative obligation on those who field fighting or-
ganizations to subject their fighting organizations to ‘internal disciplinary system
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law ap-
plicable in armed conflict.’63 This seemingly retains the commander as the primary
enforcer maxim of superior responsibility developed after World War II – at least
for an international conflict.
The Additional Protocols retained the organizational predicate for the applica-
bility of jus in bello that had been noted in all of the Post-WWII cases. There must
be a fighting organization with a responsible commander for the laws and customs
of war to even be applicable to a given situation, and the responsible commander is
the person vested with the primary enforcement capacity of the laws themselves:
‘The term “organized” is obviously rather flexible, as there are a large number of de-
grees of organization. In the first place, this should be interpreted in the sense that the
fighting should have a collective character, be conducted under proper control and ac-
cording to rules, as opposed to individuals operating in isolation with no correspond-
ing preparation or training. A “responsible” command cannot be conceived of without
the persons who make up the command structure being familiar with the law applica-
ble in armed conflict … All armed forces, groups and units are necessarily structured
and have a hierarchy, as they are subordinate to a command which is responsible to
one of the Parties to the conflict for their operations. In other words, all of them are
subordinate to a command and to a Party to the conflict, without exception, for it is
not permissible for any group to wage a private war.’64
The Commentaries to the Protocol note that the inclusion of the ‘disciplinary sys-
tem’ in Article 43 does more than vest commanders with the primary enforcement;
it also mandates the disciplinary system be included into the very definition of
whether there is an armed force to the conflict at all.
‘This was already the view of the drafters of Hague Convention IV of 1907, when
they provided in Article 1 of this Convention that “the Contracting Powers shall issue
instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regula-
tions respecting the laws and customs of war on land, annexed to the present Conven-
tion”. This requirement is rendered here with the expression “internal disciplinary sys-
tem”, which covers the field of military disciplinary law as well as that of military pe-
nal law. The modern trend is to regard violations of rules of the Protocol and of other
63. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tions of Victims of International Armed Conflicts Art. 43, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I].
64. ICRC, Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts Art. 43, para. 1672 (Yvez
Sandoz, et al., ed., 1987).
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rules of international law as matters primarily of military penal law. The principle of
the inclusion of this rule in the Protocol was from the beginning unanimously ap-
proved, as it is clearly impossible to comply with the requirements of the Protocol
without discipline.’65
Restating the requirements embedded in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Com-
mentary notes that for an armed force to be a party to the international conflict,
only four requirements must be met: (1) ‘subordination to a “Party to the conflict”
which represents a collective entity which is, at least in part, a subject of interna-
tional law’; (2) ‘an organization of a military character’; (3) ‘a responsible com-
mand exercising effective control over the members of the organization’; (4) ‘respect
for the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict’.66
Article 86 of Protocol I was a major development in the field as it gave textual
formulation to the historically developed doctrine of superior responsibility. Para-
graph 2 of Article 86 includes the three main criteria for which there is little debate;
in order for a superior to be criminally liable for the crimes of a subordinate three
criteria must be fulfilled: (1) senior-subordinate relationship; (2) actual or con-
structive notice; (3) failure to take measures to prevent the crimes.67 The commen-
taries do give credence to some form of a control test similar to that subsequently
implemented by the Tribunals to establish the presence of the relationship. ‘[I]t
should not be concluded from this that this provision only concerns the commander
under whose direct orders the subordinate is placed … The concept of the superior
is broader and should be seen in terms of a hierarchy encompassing the concept of
control.’68
The scope of the commander’s duty was expanded in Article 87 to extend an
affirmative obligation to restrain ‘members of the armed forces under their com-
mand and other persons under their control.’[emphasis added]69 This operative
provision supplied the basis for the ICTY judgment in Prosecutor v. Kordi  and
65. Ibid., para. 1675.
66. Ibid., para. 1681.
67. Additional Protocol 1, supra n. 63, Art. 86(2); ‘The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of
this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a
breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the
breach.’; see also Commentary to Protocol I, supra n. 64, Art. 86, para. 3543. For the modern articu-
lation of these precepts in the body of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, see infra
n. 107 and accompanying text.
68. Commentary to Protocol I, supra n. 64, Art. 86, para. 3544; see also ‘The German High Com-
mand Trial’, ibid., p. 76, 12 Law Reports; ‘Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita’, supra n. 61, pp. 35,
87; 4 Law Reports.
69. Additional Protocol I, supra n. 63, Art. 87(1) [emphasis added].
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erkez, in which the tribunal found military officers liable for the crimes commit-
ted by local townspeople during a period of hostile occupation.70 Article 87 re-
flects and reinforces the historic commitment to the commander as the primary
enforcer of the jus in bello.71 While its text says, essentially, that commanders are
vested with responsibility to suppress violations of the laws and customs of war,
the commentaries go much further, developing many aspects of a commander’s
duties all with an eye towards pragmatic realities of actually command.
On the other hand, the commander does not fulfill his obligations under the
laws and customs of war by simply organizing along hierarchical lines while im-
posing some system of disciplinary measures on subordinates.72 More is required.
The Commentaries, and practical experience, indicate that commanders are the
operational lynchpin. The state as an entity has the authority to enter into a conflict,
but the state only wages this conflict through its commanders.73 The commanders,
however, are not the individuals pulling triggers or detonating bombs, the indi-
vidual service members subordinate to the commanders are performing those tasks.
The commanders, as conductors of an orchestra of violence are vested under the
applicable jus in bello with the responsibility of training their players to know on
their own when to ratchet up and when to ratchet down the violence, even if no
crescendo or decrescendo signal comes from the conductor himself. This is a very
important point for scholars and jurists to understand. Because commanders are
vested with vast responsibilities and powers by the laws and customs of war, they
are also vested with the obligation to fulfill those duties in a lawful manner.
Commanders, to a large extent, fulfill their duties to suppress jus in bello viola-
tions not by being everywhere on the battlefield at the same time, nor by maintain-
ing stringent control of every single subordinate (both of which would obviously
70. Prosecutor v. Kordi  and erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber Judgement, 26 Febru-
ary 2001, para. 415.
71. Additional Protocol I, supra n. 63, Art. 87(2); ‘In order to prevent and suppress breaches,
High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of
responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware
of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol.’
72. See Commentary to Protocol I, supra n. 68, Art. 87, para. 3552; ‘This paragraph obliges the
Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict to make the control of the application of the Conven-
tions and the Protocol part of the duties of military commanders. For this purpose the text lists a series
of measures which commanders are obliged to take, namely, to prevent breaches from being commit-
ted, to suppress them when they have been committed, and to report them to the competent authorities.’
73. Ibid., para. 3550; ‘In fact the role of commanders is decisive. Whether they are concerned with
the theatre of military operations, occupied territories or places of internment, the necessary measures
for the proper application of the Conventions and the Protocol must be taken at the level of the troops,
so that a fatal gap between the undertakings entered into by Parties to the conflict and the conduct of
individuals is avoided. At this level, everything depends on commanders, and without their conscien-
tious supervision, general legal requirements are unlikely to be effective.’
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be pragmatically impossible). Commanders have an affirmative duty to train their
subordinates prior to battle to comply with the mandates of the jus in bello require-
ments without anyone telling them when and when not to take a given action. It is
almost axiomatic that the commander sets the command climate within which the
‘brothers of the close fight’ function as either a disciplined force or an armed band
filled with bloodlust. The conductor is unable to play every instrument in the or-
chestra and cannot mandate every single decision taken by the individual players
during the recital – for that is not the conductor’s job. Just as the exacting standards
of musical excellence can be met only with meticulous application by the entire
entity focused on the common task, an efficient fighting force depends on the com-
mander’s presence and participation, but only in the commander’s role. The con-
ductor/commander’s job is twofold: to prepare subordinates for the performance
based on his or her experience and best judgment and then to guide and control
them during the performance/conflict. An effective commander issues plans and
guidance prior to the onset of operations, and sets a command climate of profes-
sionalism in which he/she empowers subordinates as the conflict unfolds.74 Once
in the midst of the battle, the commander can only supervise subordinates intermit-
tently, the gaps must be filled by trusting that the commander has prepared them in
the most efficacious manner.
The duties of a commander to ensure compliance with jus in bello by training
and proper supervision on the battlefield are integral to the preeminent duty of a
commander: to exercise command of his subordinates.75 This aspect of leadership
is the quintessential core of the commander’s professional responsibility, and may
well be seen as its highest moral and legal manifestation.76 Although the scope of
the duty may differ depending on the individual commander and the size of the
unit, essentially, the duty is the same: to prepare the subordinates under one’s con-
trol for battle and to prepare them in a way which respects the laws and customs of
74. Ibid., para. 3550 (‘Undoubtedly the development of a battle may not permit a commander to
exercise control over his troops all the time; but in this case he must impose discipline to a sufficient
degree, to enforce compliance with the rules of the Conventions and the Protocol, even when he may
momentarily lose sight of his troops.’).
75. Ibid., para. 3562; ‘The object of these texts is to ensure that military commanders at every
level exercise the power vested in them, both with regard to the provisions of the Conventions and the
Protocol, and with regard to other rules of the army to which [p. 1023] they belong. Such powers exist
in all armies. They may concern, at any level, informing superior officers of what is taking place in the
sector, drawing up a report in the case of a breach, or intervening with a view to preventing a breach
from being committed, proposing a sanction to a superior who has disciplinary power, or – in the case
of someone who holds such power himself – exercising it, within the limits of his competence.’
76. R. Puckett, Words for Warriors: A Professional Soldier’s Notebook (Tucson AZ, Wheatmark
Press 2007) p. 112; ‘As commanders we are responsible for instilling a strong moral compass in our
troops. We begin the day we take command. We cannot stop until we are no longer in command. We
develop this moral compass in training before our Soldiers are subjected to the pressures of combat.’
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war and ensures that the tenets held in those laws are not violated.77 This obligation
remains constant even if irregular troops without a proper training are attached to a
given commander.78 The essence of command is the general duty to maintain disci-
pline, but also the inherent duty to function within an organized structure, which of
necessity means informing higher commanders of what is happening within one’s
unit. By logical extension, any commander who seeks to maintain a high degree of
unit cohesion should never intentionally disregard the duty to prevent subordinates
from committing war crimes because they would then logically assume that he had
possessed no a priori intent to punish such violations. These duties would be inte-
gral to the general command authority whether or not they were embedded in the
applicable jus in bello. All of these requirements that the jus in bello places upon a
commander are actually helpful requirements to a commander who is focused on
maintaining sufficient discipline to accomplish a military mission. 79 The obliga-
tion to prevent and punish violations is not properly seen as an unwieldy distrac-
tion superimposed by external actors because it is an essential component of a
viable command structure focused on lawfully achieving military success. In this
sense the text of the law recognizes the art of command by requiring a modicum of
training in the laws and war, a certain amount of supervision of one’s troops and
maintaining lines of communication open to higher commanders.
The application of centuries old theory of command is no less important in non-
international armed conflicts. Protocol II relaxes the requirements of a military
hierarchy, but importantly retains the requirements of an orders process and an
internal disciplinary system. The orders process is a requirement in order to main-
tain the organization. Without any amount of top-down control of the organization,
there is simply a mass of people operating in the same general manner, yet some
top-down control in the form of an orders process is essential for the formation of
a fighting organization. Nothing in Protocol II indicates that this is varied for non-
state actors in a non-international conflict. In fact, the Commentary points out that:
‘The existence of a responsible command implies some degree of organization of the
insurgent armed group or dissident armed forces, but this does not necessarily mean
that there is a hierarchical system of military organization similar to that of regular
armed forces. It means an organization capable, on the one hand, of planning and car-
77. See Commentary to Protocol I, supra n. 68, Art. 87, para. 3558; ‘If, as in many armies, the
commander of a unit is responsible for the instruction of his men, it will be up to him to ensure,
primarily through the commissioned and non-commissioned officers under his command, that his unit
gets proper training. He will ensure that this is done either periodically or expressly before an engage-
ment.’
78. See ibid., para. 3554.
79. See generally, ibid., para. 3563.
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rying out sustained and concerted military operations, and on the other, of imposing
discipline in the name of a de facto authority.’80
Though Article 1 in Protocol II is the analog to Article 43 of Protocol I, there is no
corresponding articles that rephrase Articles 86 and 87 of Protocol I for non-state
actors in the context of non-international armed conflicts. The jurisprudence of the
ad hoc tribunals has filled these lacunae through the evolution of the effective
control test as noted below.
4. LEX LATA OF SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
The doctrine of superior responsibility is unique from other modes of liability in
that it is predicated on an active omission which violates a duty to act.81 The doc-
trine of responsible command vests commanders with an ongoing duty to restrain
their subordinates from committing war crimes.82 This precept flows from the cus-
toms of war, has achieved customary international status, and has been in place for
centuries:83
80. See ibid., Art. 1 para. 4463.
81. elebi i Trial Judgement, para. 334; ‘[T]he criminal responsibility of superiors for failing to
take measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of their subordinates is best understood when
seen against the principle that criminal responsibility for omissions is incurred only where there exists
a legal obligation to act … [B]y Article 87 [AP I], international law imposes an affirmative duty on
superiors to prevent persons under their control from committing violations of international humani-
tarian law, and it is ultimately this duty that provides the basis for, and defines the contours of, the
imputed criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute.’; Kordi Trial Judgement, para. 369;
Halilovi Trial Judgement, para. 38.
82. See Delali  Trial Judgement para. 340; ‘The concomitant principle under which a superior
may be held criminally responsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates where the superior
has failed to properly exercise this duty is formulated in Article 86.’; see also Prosecutor v. Ori , Case
No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgement, 20 June 2006, para. 326; ‘superior criminal responsibility presup-
poses a duty of the superior the purpose of which is, first and foremost, the prevention of crimes of
subordinates that are about to be committed, and in the second place, the punishment of subordinates
who have already committed crimes.’ (footnotes and citations omitted); Hadžihasanovi  Case No. IT-
01-47, 16 July 2003, para. 14, In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the matter rests on the dual
principle of responsible command and its corollary command responsibility.’
83. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanovi , Case No. IT-01-47, supra n. 15, para. 16 (16 July
2003; ‘Thus, whether Article 3 of the Statute is referring to war crimes committed in the course of
international armed conflict or to war crimes committed in the course of internal armed conflict under
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, it assumes that there is an organized military force. It is
evident that there cannot be an organized military force save on the basis of responsible command. It is
also reasonable to hold that it is responsible command which leads to command responsibility. Com-
mand responsibility is the most effective method by which international criminal law can enforce
responsible command.’
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‘[W]herever customary international law recognizes that a war crime can be commit-
ted by a member of an organised military force, it also recognizes that a commander
can be penally sanctioned if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate was
about to commit a prohibited act or had done so and the commander failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such an act or to punish the subordi-
nate. Customary international law recognizes that some war crimes can be committed
by a member of an organised military force in the course of an internal armed conflict;
it therefore also recognizes that there can be command responsibility in respect of
such crimes.’84
Though for much of history, command responsibility has been limited strictly to
military commanders who were responsible for subordinates to commit war crimes,
the recent explosion of the corpus of international criminal law has extended the
form of liability to civilian superiors who satisfy the requisite elements.85 In mod-
ern jurisprudence, the status of the perpetrator either as a military or a civilian
superior is immaterial.86 However, a military commander or civilian superior may
be held responsible only for the actions of subordinates over whom the evidence
demonstrates a degree of control sufficient to generate individual responsibility on
the part of the superior.87 Courts therefore make detailed factual determinations
84. Hadžihasanovi , supra n. 15, para. 18.
85. Prosecutor v. Delali , et al., Case No. IT-96-21, 20 February 2001, para. 195-197. See also
Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 308; ‘[T]he scope of Article 7(3) of the Statute extends
beyond classical ‘command responsibility’ to a truly ‘superior criminal responsibility’, and does not
only include military commanders within its scope of liability, but also political leaders and other
civilian superiors in possession of authority.’ The doctrine applies equally to both internationalized
and non-internationalized conflicts. Hadžihasanovi , supra n. 15,para. 20; ‘Thus, the fact that it was
in the course of an internal armed conflict that a war crime was about to be committed or was commit-
ted is not relevant to the responsibility of the commander; that only goes to the characteristics of the
particular crime and not to the responsibility of the commander.’
86. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement, 21 May 1999,
para. 227. The Chamber held that it is ‘under a duty … to consider the responsibility of all individuals
who exercised effective control, whether that control be de jure or de facto’. ‘The doctrine of com-
mand responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the power of the superior to control the acts of his
subordinates.’ The Chamber must ‘be prepared to pierce such veils of formalism that may shield those
individuals carrying the greatest responsibility’. The Chamber noted that concentrating upon the de
jure powers of the accused would improperly represent the situation at the time, and could prejudice
either side by improperly representing the authority of the accused. ‘Where it can be shown that the
accused was the de jure or de facto superior and that pursuant to his orders the atrocities were commit-
ted, then the Chamber considers that this must suffice to [find] command responsibility.’ See also Ori
Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 309, ‘Although formal appointment within a hierarchical structure
of command may still prove to be the best basis for incurring individual criminal responsibility as a
superior, the broadening of this liability as described above is supported by the fact that the borderline
between military and civil authority can be fluid.’
87. Trial Chambers have been careful to note that this determination is not a simple ability to
‘generally influence’ behavior of subordinates, but rather the relationship must be more specific, in
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that the superior was able to control the actions of the subordinates who committed
the crimes; thus it is immaterial whether the claim of superior authority is based
upon de jure or de facto control over the subordinates.88
Rather than relying on formalistic determinations of the legal state of the fight-
ing organization and the superior, the superior must be shown to have effective
control over the subordinates to satisfy this element of the superior responsibil-
ity.89 Yet, the notion that the superior-subordinate relationship element turns on the
effective control of the subordinates by the superior is a misnomer since the effec-
tive control contains a further test.90 The essential element in the effective control
test is whether the superior possessed ‘the material ability to prevent or punish the
commission of the principal crimes’.91 However, this ability does not necessarily
have to come in the form of a legal authority to prevent or punish. Under the
doctrine of command responsibility, a superior who lacks the legal authority to
punish may be held liable if the superior could have initiated the investigation of a
subordinate by reporting to appropriate authorities.92 This recognizes that formal-
certain circumstances even ‘substantial influence’ by itself has not been sufficient. Semanza Trial
Judgement, para. 402; elebi i Appeal Judgement, para. 266; Kordi Trial Judgement, para. 840;
Naletili Trial Judgement, para. 68; Staki Trial Judgement, para. 459; Branin Trial Judgement, para.
276; Blagojevi Trial Judgement, para. 791; Ntagerura Trial Judgement, para. 628; Kayishem Trial
Judgement para. 202.
88. Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Chamber Judge-
ment, 7 July 2006, para. 143. ‘[The Trial Chamber’s] analysis focuses on the Appellant’s de jure
authority – specifically, whether the ‘law’ placed him in power and whether he was ‘a superior within
a formal administrative hierarchy.’ The Trial Chamber does not appear to have considered the Appel-
lant’s de facto authority. This was an error. A superior ‘possesses power or authority over subordinates
either de jure or de facto; it is not necessary for that power or authority to arise from official appoint-
ment.’ At <http://69.94.11.53/default.htm>.
89. See elebi i Appeal Judgement, paras. 192 et seq., Kayishema Appeal Judgement, para. 294;
Bagilishema Appeal Judgement, para. 50. For cases follwing elebi i in principle but occasionally
employing different terminology, see Aleksovski Trial Judgement, para. 76; Prosecutor v. Blaski ,
Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber Judgement, 3 May 2000, para. 301; Kunarac Trial Judgement,
para. 396; Kvo ka Trial Judgement, para. 315; Staki Trial Judgement, para. 459; Krnojelac Trial
Judgement, para. 93; Naletili Trial Judgement, para. 67; Gali Trial Judgement, para. 173; Brjanin
Trial Judgement, para. 276; Blagojevi Trial Judgement, para. 791; Strugar Trial Judgement, para.
360; Bagilishema Trial Judgement, para. 39; Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-
T, Judgement, 16 May 2003 (Niyitegeka Trial Judgement), para. 472; Kajelijeli Trial Judgement, para.
773.
90. elebi i Appeals Chamber Judgement, paras. 192 et seq.
91. Prosecutor v. Blaski , Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber Judgement, 3 May 2000, para. 301;
‘[I]n order for the principle of superior responsibility to be applicable, it is necessary that the superior
have effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of international humani-
tarian law, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these
offences.’ Prosecutor v. Kordi  and erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Judgement, 17 December 2004,
para. 840. Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 311.
92. Prosecutor v. Blaski , Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber Judgement, 3 May 2000, para. 302.
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ized military systems may empower commanders to punish subordinates through
disciplinary referral – an ability clearly showing a superior/subordinate relation-
ship without individualized capacity to punish. Furthermore, where multiple supe-
riors have effective control over a subordinate who perpetrates a crime, each may
be held liable for the same underlying crime.93
The mens rea requirement is firmly established as constructive or actual notice.
This, admittedly, falls short of the intent elements that the direct modes of liability
require. Courts have no conceptual barriers to lowering the mens rea requirement
since the mode of liability is based upon a failure to act, and where there is a failure
to act, at most a prosecutor will be able to prove knowledge.94 As the ICTY ob-
served in the Ori  case (described in more detail below):
‘[I]t appears no less misleading to require a mental standard tantamount to ‘malicious
intent’. By contenting itself with having had “reason to know” instead of requiring ac-
tual knowledge, superior criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute obvi-
ously does not presuppose intent of the superior with regard to crimes of his subordi-
nates, let alone a malicious one. What is required though, beyond solely negligent ig-
norance, is the superior’s factual awareness of information which, due to his position,
should have provided a reason to avail himself or herself of further knowledge. With-
out any such subjective requirement, the alternative basis of superior criminal respon-
sibility by having had ‘reason to know’ would be diminished into a purely objective
one and, thus, run the risk of transgressing the borderline to “strict liability”. This is
not the case, however, as soon as he or she has been put on notice by available infor-
mation as described above.’95
So, in practice, prosecutors must prove:
‘[I]ndividual criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) requires no more than the su-
perior either (a) having known or (b) having had reason to know that his subordinates
were about to commit relevant criminal acts or had already done so. Whereas the
former requires proof of actual knowledge, the latter requires proof only of some
grounds which would have enabled the superior to become aware of the relevant
crimes of his or her subordinates.’96
93. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Trial Chamber Judgement, 25 June 1999,
para. 106.
94. See Prosecutor v. Ori , supra n. 82, para. 317 (30 July 2006); ‘By permitting the attribution of
criminal responsibility to a superior for what is in actual fact a lack of due diligence in supervising the
conduct of his subordinates, Article 7(3) in this respect sets itself apart by being satisfied with a mens
rea falling short of the threshold requirement of intent under Article 7(1) of the Statute.’
95. Ibid., para. 323.
96. Ibid., para. 317; see also Ntagurera Trial Judgement para. 629; ‘A superior will be found to
have possessed or will be imputed with the requisite mens rea sufficient to incur criminal responsibil-
ity provided that: (i) the superior had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial
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Neither actual notice, nor constructive notice may be presumed solely from the
position of the superior; however, notice may be inferred from the entirety of the
circumstances.97 There is no requirement that the superior read the information,
simply that the information is available to the superior such to put him on notice
and that it is specific enough to have put the superior on notice that crimes were
either being committed or about to be committed.98 Examples of information that
has been deemed sufficient include: subordinates with a notoriously violent or
unstable character; subordinates drinking prior to going on mission; but these are
only indicative of notice if these ‘indications point to the same type of crimes as
the superior was supposed to prevent or punish, as opposed to merely general crimi-
nal activity’.99
The measures that a superior should take depend upon the temporal relationship
between the notice and the crimes. If the notice comes before the crimes then the
superior is vested with the responsibility to take measures to suppress or prevent
the crimes from taking place; in this case a superior cannot cure a failure to prevent
by punishing after the fact as that would defeat the entire purpose of vesting supe-
riors with the capacity as primary enforcers of the laws and customs of warfare.100
If the notice comes after the crimes then the superior is vested with the responsibil-
ity to take measures to prosecute those who committed the crimes.101 The duty to
punish is triggered ‘only if, and when, the commission of a crime by a subordinate
can be reasonably suspected’.102
After there is notice to the superior that crimes are either being committed or
have been committed a duty of vigilance is triggered. In order to be liable for
evidence, that his subordinates were about to commit, were committing, or had committed, a crime
under the statute; or (ii) the superior possessed information providing notice of the risk of such of-
fences by indicating the need for additional investigations in order to ascertain whether such offences
were about to be committed, were being committed, or had been committed by subordinates.’
97. See Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, paras. 319, 321; see also Baglishema Trial Judgement
para. 968; Ntagurera Trial Judgement para. 648; ‘In determining whether a superior, despite his pleas
to the contrary, must have possessed the requisite knowledge of the offences, the following indicia are
relevant: (a) the number of illegal acts; (b) the type of illegal acts; (c) the scope of illegal acts; (d) the
time during which the illegal acts occurred; (e) the number and type of troops involved; (f) the logistics
involved; (g) the geographical location of the acts; (h) the widespread occurrence of the acts; (i) the
tactical tempo of the operations; (j) the modus operandi of similar illegal acts; (k) the officers and staff
involved; and (l) the location of the commander at the time.’
98. Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 322.
99. Ibid., para. 323.
100. Ibid., para. 326; Staki Trial Judgement, para. 461; Brjanin Trial Judgement, para. 279;
Prosecutor v. Halilovi , Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgement of the Trial Chamber, para. 72; Blaški
Appeal Judgement, para. 83; Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 527; Hadžihasanovi Trial Judgement,
paras. 125 et seq.
101. Blaški Appeal Judgement, para. 83; Halilovi Trial Judgement, supra n. 100, para. 93; Limaj
Trial Judgement, para. 527; Hadžihasanovi Trial Judgement, paras. 125 et seq.
102. Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 336.
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failure to take measures a superior must be shown to have effective control over
the subordinates both at the time the crimes were committed and when notice to
the superior took place.103 Ultimately the criminal liability of the superior stems
not from the relationship with the subordinates, nor from the actual acts of the
subordinates, nor from a failure to process available information about the subor-
dinate’s atrocities, it flows from the failure to take measures to suppress the subor-
dinate’s actions.104 This formulaic approach creates a narrow lens that undervalues
the role of the superior as the responsible authority for initiating acts of violence,
even as it rewards those who avoid any direct supervisory involvement as the or-
ganization that they fielded commits crimes in the field.
5. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A PENDING PROBLEM
5.1 Atrocity by connivance: the jurisprudential conflict
As theories of command and superior responsibility have evolved to embrace de
facto lines of authority and been applied to crimes against humanity and genocide
offenses, their pedigree remains rooted in the doctrine of responsible command
arising from the conduct of hostilities.105 As noted above, the ad hoc tribunals had
begun to litigate the rough contours of superior responsibility by the time the Rome
Statute was being negotiated. It appears from the diplomatic record that there was
little haggling by states over the margins of the doctrine at the Rome Conference.106
Significantly, the ICRC notes that there was no controversy in the ICC negotiations
that the doctrine applies to non-international conflicts.107 The delegates to the Rome
103. Hadžihasanovi Jurisdiction Appeal Decision, paras. 37 et seq., 51.
104. Ntagurera Trial Judgement para. 630; ‘A superior may incur responsibility only for having
failed to take “necessary and reasonable measures” to prevent or punish a crime under the Statute
committed by subordinates. The degree of the superior’s effective control guides the assessment of
whether the individual took reasonable measures to prevent, stop, or punish a subordinates’ crime.’;
see also Semanza Trial Judgement para. 406
105. Hadžihasanovi , supra n. 15, para. 29; ‘The Appeals Chamber affirms the view of the Trial
Chamber that command responsibility was part of customary international law relating to interna-
tional armed conflicts before the adoption of Protocol I. Therefore, as the Trial Chamber considered,
Articles 86 and 87 of Protocol I were in this respect only declaring the existing position, and not
constituting it. In like manner, the non-reference in Protocol II to command responsibility in relation to
internal armed conflicts did not necessarily affect the question whether command responsibility previ-
ously existed as part of customary international law relating to internal armed conflicts.’
106. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criiminal Court:
An Article-by-Article Evolution of the Statute, Vol. 2 (Ardsley NY, Transnational Publishers 2005)
pp. 210-214.
107. Henckaerts and Doswald Beck, supra n. 4, p. 560.
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Conference did confirm that the doctrine was equally applicable to both military
commanders and civilian leaders if the established predicates were met – the gen-
esis of this notion was in ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence. The adoption by states in
Article 28 of the Rome Statute widening the margins of the doctrine to embrace
military commanders and those ‘effectively acting as a military commander’ as
well as any other superior added legitimacy to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals by reinforcing the established understanding that de facto control was an
equally viable basis to support the doctrine as de jure authority.108 Article 28 did
recognize the differentiation between military and civilian organizational hierar-
chies by requiring that the civilian supervisor either know or consciously disregard
information about the commission of criminal acts by subordinates. This provision
stands in sharp contrast to the military commander [or de facto commander] to
whom knowledge may be imputed based on the inherent obligations and authority
of the title commander. One other significant step taken by the states was a textual
reaffirmation of Protocol I Article 87 by the addition of the word ‘repress’ into
Article 28. The ad hoc tribunals did not include this word, though the 1977 Proto-
col had in Article 87, and by negotiating it back into the language of the Rome
Statute the states at the Rome Conference seemed to reinvigorate the notion of
suppression that is an integral component of command in its highest professional
sense. However, the debates over Article 28 did little to clarify the conceptual basis
for the responsibility of commanders and superiors that formed the basis of inter-
national consensus in the negotiations.
108. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF 183/9, 2187 UNTS
90, 37 ILM 1002, entered into force 1 July 2002, Art. 28 (1998)[hereinafter Rome Statute]. Responsi-
bility of commanders and other superiors. In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under
this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court: (a) A military commander or person effec-
tively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective author-
ity and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
forces, where: (i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and (ii) That
military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution. (b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described
in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or
her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: (i) The superior either knew, or
consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing
or about to commit such crimes; (ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and (iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reason-
able measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
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Thus, despite the historicity of the precepts of superior responsibility, modern
judicial applications do not proceed from a commonality of understanding that was
developed to address modern realities. It is not surprising that their application
remains imprecise and often controversial, which in turn has led courts to make
formulaic applications that can at times disregard the reality of military command.
This problem is exacerbated with respect to nontraditional military forces and com-
manders who do not function in clean hierarchical channels. For example, the ICTY
Hadžihasanovi  Interlocutory Appeal Decision is primarily understood to stand
for the proposition that superior responsibility is a valid form of individual crimi-
nal responsibility in both internationalized and non-internationalized conflicts, but
the other issue at bar in that appeal is equally interesting and important. How one
thinks of superior responsibility on the philosophical level will largely determine
how one comes out on the issue of the Second Ground of the Interlocutory Appeal:
that the ‘Trial Chamber erred in law when it concluded that “in principle a com-
mander can be liable under the doctrine of command responsibility for crimes com-
mitted prior to the moment that the commander assumed command”.’109
The majority of the Appeals Chamber overturned the holding by the Trial Cham-
ber that a commander could be liable for crimes committed prior to the assumption
of command.110  The majority rested its holding on nullem crimen sine lege grounds
109. Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanovi , et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, 27 November 2002,
para. 12, at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasanovic_kubura/ind/en/had-ai020111e.pdf>. At all
times relevant to this indictment, Enver Hadžihanovi , Mehmed Alagic, and Amir Kubura were re-
quired to abide by the laws and customs governing the conduct of armed conflicts, including the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto. Furthermore, Enver Hadžihanovi ,
Mehmed Alagic, and Amir Kubura were responsible for ensuring that military units under their com-
mand and control respected and applied these rules of international law. Moreover, Enver Hadžihanovi ,
Mehmed Alagic, and Amir Kubura were obliged by superior order to initiate proceedings for legal
sanctions against individuals under their command and control who had violated the international law
of war.
110. Hadžihasanovi , supra n. 15, para. 51; ‘Having examined the above authorities, the Appeals
Chamber holds that an accused cannot be charged under Article 7(3) of the Statute for crimes commit-
ted by a subordinate before the said accused assumed command over that subordinate. The Appeals
Chamber is aware that views on this issue may differ. However, the Appeals Chamber holds the view
that this Tribunal can impose criminal responsibility only if the crime charged was clearly established
under customary law at the time the events in issue occurred.’; see also ibid., para. 52 ‘Whether the
principle of command responsibility extends to crimes committed prior to the assumption of command
is a difficult legal question, and reasonable minds may certainly debate the point. To assert, as the
dissenting Judges do, that such a dereliction clearly carries individual criminal liability under existing
principle seems indefensible. It is trite to observe that in international criminal law, imposition of
criminal liability must rest on a positive and solid foundation of a customary law principle. It falls to
the distinguished dissenting Judges to show that such a foundation exists; it does not fall to the Appeals
Chamber to demonstrate that it does not.’ See also Prosecutor v. Naser Ori , Case No. IT-03-68-A,
Appeals Chamber Judgement (3 July 2008); following the same rule as Hadžihasanovi  with strong
separate opinions from Judges Shahabuddeen, Liu, and Schomburg, at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
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by ruling that the issue was a debatable point and that it must hold in a manner
most favorable to the accused. The majority held that ‘[i]n this particular case, no
practice can be found, nor is there any evidence of opinio juris that would sustain
the proposition that a commander can be held responsible for crimes committed by
a subordinate prior to the commander’s assumption of command over that subordi-
nate.’111 However, when superiors are viewed as the primary enforcers of the laws
and customs of war then situations may present themselves which militate against
this bright line rule. In dissent, Judge Shahabuddeen implicitly understood that
superior responsibility – when viewed through the more historically accurate lens
of military professionalism and the philosophy of command authority – could, at
times, extend to crimes committed before the commander assumed command.112
Moreover, the policy goal of crafting legal norms that facilitate the prevention and
punishment of those who violate the laws and customs of war mitigates for the
broadest application of command responsibility. Thus, a rule with no per se tempo-
ral restraints and one that is equally applicable to state and non-state actors would
have been the most desirable.
The bright line rule drawn by the Appeals Chamber is convenient and at first
blush seems to be the logical and appropriate answer that can satisfy nullem crimen
sine lege standard for imposing accountability. Yet, the matter becomes more mud-
dled when one considers that the individual criminal responsibility of a leader is
based on a violation of a superior’s ever-present duty to suppress or punish stem-
ming from the laws and customs of war vesting superiors with the primary enforce-
ment capacity. Correctly stated, the commander has the legal obligation to prevent
and/or punish violations committed by subordinate units.113 Command is an active
verb, and carries with it a high degree of inherent moral and legal responsibility.
oric/acjug/en/080703.pdf>; following the same rule as Hadžihasanovi  with strong separate opinions
from Judges Shahabuddeen, Liu, and Schomburg.
111. Hadžihasanovi , supra n. 15, para. 52.
112. Ibid., at para. 1 (Shahabuddeen, J. dissenting).
113. Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Topical Digest of the Case Law of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (New York Human Rights Watch 2006)
p. 484 n. 51. As to whether there is a duty to ‘prevent or punish’ or ‘prevent and punish’ the formulation
could be considered to be as follows. If the commander has taken reasonable steps to prevent the
commission of the crime and has succeeded, there is no obligation to punish since no crime occurred
and the word ‘or’ is appropriate. If the commander has taken reasonable steps to prevent the commis-
sion of the crime but failed, the commander has an obligation to punish the perpetrators, which would
absolve the commander of criminal responsibility. If, the commander has taken no reasonable steps to
prevent a crime, a violation has already occurred; however, the commander still has a continuing
obligation to punish the perpetrators of the crime. In these latter instances, the word ‘and’ is appropri-
ate. If only one word is used, it seems preferable to use ‘and’, because the word ‘or’ fails to reflect that
there are two distinct legal obligations. See ‘there are two distinct legal obligations’, Section
(VI)(c)(iii)(1), ICTY Digest. Given that the ICTY Statute uses the term ‘or,’ the ‘and/or’ formulation is
a possible solution.
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Since the 1970s it has become clear that the permission and guidance of an author-
ity figure is the primary enabling mechanism which moves groups of men from a
peaceful collectivity to an organized group of fighters.114 History is replete with
examples of leaders whose personal influence became the essential element lead-
ing to military operational effectiveness.115 Empirical data is beginning to clearly
point to authority figures as a major factor in the success or failure of a given
military operation, and the importance of the authority figure is inflated in an asym-
metric conflict. The United States doctrine for counterinsurgency operations ex-
pressly highlights this point as follows: ‘Movement leaders provide strategic
direction to the insurgency. They are the “idea people” and the planners. They
usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of revolution-
ary ideas, and personal charisma. In some instances, they may hold their position
through religious, clan, or tribal authority.’116
Soldiers in combat are looking to have someone else make decisions for them,
and in fact are under legal duties to obey the orders of superiors.117 The command-
er’s role is to lead men to act in ways that contravene their internal instinct to
survive. The motivational force of an authority figure is often the essential element
in determining whether a military mission succeeds or fails because the subordi-
nates’ fear or anger clouds their ability to make decisions due to an inability to
retain forebrain cognizance. In such situations, the group dynamic takes over to
make individual fighters act as one based on the course of conduct marked as
desirable by the commander. This notion has been around forever. Much as the
farmer must move a group of animals to serve his purposes, the commander must
issue guidance and enforce behavioral norms when that guidance is disregarded or
114. D. Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society
(Boston, Little Brown 1995) p. 143; ‘Someone who has not studied the matter would underestimate the
influence of leadership in enabling killing on the battlefield but those who have been there know better.
A 1973 study by Kranss, Kaplan, and Kranss investigated the factors that make a soldier fire. They
found that the individuals who had no combat experience assumed that “being fired upon” would be
the critical factor in making them fire. However, veterans listed “being told to fire” as the most critical
factor.’
115. See J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books 1983) p. 114; ‘For the
English [at Agincourt], the presence of the King would also have provided what present-day soldiers
call a ‘moral factor’ of great importance. The personal bond between leader and follower lies at the
root of all explanations of what does and does not happen in battle: and that bond is always strongest
in martial societies.’; see also at p. 277, noting that Commanders were the most important human
factor in willing the masses to fight in the First World War.’
116. Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No.
3-33.5, Counterinsurgency 1-61 (15 December 2006) at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/
Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf>.
117. See generally L.C. Green, ‘Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man’, in Essays on the Mod-
ern Law of War 2nd edn. (Ardsley NY, Transnational Publishers 1999) p. 245, ‘discussing the scope of
the duty to obey and recounting the national legislation reinforcing such a duty.’
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disobeyed. That is the essence of military leadership. By extension, if the com-
mander ignores grievous crimes committed prior to the assumption of command,
the message is clear and the approval of that course of conduct is apparent. This
reality is distinct from the legal truism that there can be no lawful defense for
criminal activity during conflict based on the receipt of superior orders (or, as is
often the case, the perceived authority for violations.)118 In such an instance, there
often is no express order to commit atrocities because it is unnecessary. In that
manner, a direct individual responsibility by the commander may be easily avoided,
even as the climate fosters continued illegal acts.
Acceptance of previous criminal conduct by the authority figure represents an
acquiescence that creates a command climate which conveys that future crimes
will not be penalized. As famed historian S.L.A. Marshall noted, ‘when an officer
winks at any depredation by his men, it is no different than if he had committed the
act’.119 The implicit permission given by a present authority figure by acquies-
cence and silent approbation has been labeled ‘atrocity by connivance’.120 The
difficulties of proof become obvious for a prosecutor trapped by the formula. In
the absence of orders or the personal involvement of the leader, impunity may very
well result based on a finding that there was no effective control over those subor-
dinates at that time in that place for those crimes. Units will predictably continue to
commit atrocities outside direct supervision, and the commander will avoid the
technical reach of the law by ensuring that he remains unaware of precise opera-
tions or specific atrocities. In irregular units and non-traditional lines of command,
this tendency is arguably the norm. The climate of impunity in the rebel band is
matched by the impunity in the courtroom because of the legal matrix used to
evaluate effective control.
The most troubling permutations of the majority decision in Hadižhasanovi
are apparent in a scenario where a commander is vested with de jure authority over
subordinates and thereafter receives actual notice that crimes were committed.121
Yet another scenario is equally troubling to jurists who believe that commanders
are vested with both the opportunities and the responsibilities of commanding and
controlling their subordinates. When there is a change of commander what hap-
pens when crimes are committed by subordinates during the few days that it often
takes to functionally change the commander?122 This temporal problem may be
118. Rome Statute, supra n. 108, Art. 33.
119. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, The Officer as Leader (Harrisburg PA, Stackpole Books 1966) p. 274.
120. Osiel, supra n. 25, at p. 189.
121. Shahabuddeen also believes that criminality would flow even where there was constructive
notice. Supra n. 112, para. 14, ‘Thus approached, there appears to be force in the argument that the
responsibilities of a new commander extend to dealing with crimes committed by subordinates before
he assumes command if he knows or has reason to know of the crimes.’
122. Although commands in industrialized armed forces are hardly ever without a de jure supe-
rior, even in these units changing the command takes longer that a simple ceremony. It is likely that for
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exacerbated during the kind of non-international armed conflicts with uncertain
and shifting command structures that are the norm in modern conflicts. Judge
Shahabuddeen framed the problem this way: ‘such crimes could fall between two
stools. The crimes might have been committed very shortly before the assumption
of duty of the new commander – possibly, the day before, when all those in previ-
ous command authority disappeared.’123
Judge Shahabuddeen argued in dissent that the silence of Article 28 of the Rome
Statute with respect to retrospective application should not be taken as dispositive
evidence of the correct state of customary international law. Indeed, in his view ‘if
[a particular] situation is omitted from the texts in question, it does not follow that
it is not penalized under customary international law’.124 He ultimately concluded
in his dissent that the notion, that a commander is categorically not responsible for
crimes committed before the assumption of command, is incompatible with the
theories of responsible command that are inextricably intertwined with superior
responsibility and both flow from customary international law and treaty law.125
The notion of a continual responsible command over the fighting organization re-
quires an objective, continual, ever-present duty to suppress future crimes and punish
past crimes.126 Shahabuddeen opined that all that is required by the ICTY Statute is
that there was effective control of subordinates when the new commander received
notice of prior criminal acts.127 Finally, and likely the most compelling argument,
is the basis for superior responsibility rests on that fact that a superior is liable for
his actions in failing to suppress or punish future or past criminal behavior, not the
imputed action of the subordinates; where there is a failure to properly suppress128
or punish then criminal liability must follow no matter when the crimes were com-
mitted if they were committed by a given superior’s subordinates and the superior
had notice then he is under an independent duty to punish those subordinates.129
a few days on either side of that ceremony there would be no commander who maintains de facto
control over the subordinates and the subordinates are likely left to their own devices.
123. Hadžihasanovi , supra n. 15, para. 14 (Shahabuddeen dissenting).
124. Ibid., para. 20 n. 63 (Shahabuddeen dissenting).
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., paras. 20 and 25 (Shahabuddeen dissenting).
127. Ibid., para. 29 (Shahabuddeen dissenting); ‘This would let in cases in which the subordinate
“had committed crimes” even before that relationship began; in other words, the commission of the
crime need not be contemporaneous with the existence of the superior /subordinate relationship.’
128. Or, in the language of Article 28 of the Rome Statute, ‘repress such violations’.
129. Hadžihasanovi , supra n. 15, para. 32 (Shahabuddeen dissenting); ‘The position of the ap-
pellants seems to be influenced by their belief that Article 7(3) of the Statute has the effect, as they say,
of making the commander “guilty of an offence committed by others even though he neither possessed
the applicable mens rea nor had any involvement whatsoever in the actus reus”. 27 No doubt, argu-
ments can be made in support of that reading of the provision, but I prefer to interpret the provision as
making the commander guilty for failing in his supervisory capacity to take the necessary corrective
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Therefore the duty to suppress or punish must extend beyond the assumption of
command if the other predicates of superior responsibility are established.
In a modern world of asymmetric warfare that may see something of a revolving
door of command as warlords rise and fall, or young child soldiers are replaced by
more aggressive peers, the majority opinion runs the risk of creating a zone of
impunity within the quasi-military organization in a non-international armed con-
flict. On the other hand, the duty to suppress or punish is inherently a commander’s
duty and the benefits and perks of being in command also carry the responsibilities
of primary enforcer of the laws and customs of war. This is an elemental truth,
regardless of the nature of the conflict, and one that the majority ignored. The
majority position seems to center on the formalities of the relationship rather than
the inherent duties that flow from the commander, which is an understanding inte-
gral to Shahabuddeen’s dissent. In the context of the modern application of com-
mand responsibility theory, the debate is important because the legal formula for
establishing effective control utilized by the majority has the effect of narrowing
the relevant band of evidence by limiting the relevant timeline for assessing culpa-
bility to a particular place and time. This all must be evaluated from the perspective
of what is feasible within the limits of what may well be a shifting and uncertain
chain of authority and operations carried out across many miles and in often im-
passable terrain. In fact, this test, if applied to its logical extreme, means that any
commander who assumes command and simply does not inquire into the previous
operations of the force may be able to gain impunity under the legal framework
itself. In sharp contrast, Judge Shahabuddeen’s approach affixes a clear temporal
line of authority that flows directly to the time that the authority figure assumed
command. The responsibility both to prevent future conduct and to ameliorate past
misconduct flows to the commander at that time and is inherent in the duty to
control the application of violence. It cannot be avoided by resort to legal techni-
calities or the vagaries of different fact finders in judicial proceedings. The inves-
tigation and punishment of alleged atrocities is an affirmative aspect of command
from this perspective, and the relevant temporal period is not subject to debate – if
the commander is in command, then the duty to establish a climate of compliance
with humanitarian law attaches to him/her irrespective of when the acts were com-
mitted.
Thus, with a slight, but profoundly important and historically defensible, altera-
tion of perspective about the nature and obligations incumbent due to the very
position of command, the scales of the debate tip towards Shahabuddeen’s posi-
tion. The concept of effective control is therefore made concurrent with the nature
action after he knows or has reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit the act or had
done so. Reading the provision reasonably, it could not have been designed to make the commander a
party to the particular crime committed by his subordinate.’
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of superior authority by refocusing from a temporally and geographically circum-
scribed dependence on the precise relationship between the commander and sub-
ordinate to an acceptance of the ever-present duty of the commander as the primary
enforcement mechanism of the laws and customs of war. In other enforcement
mechanisms a change of the primary enforcer does not relieve the new individual
from the duty of diligence. No prosecutor on earth assuming his post would think
that he was relieved of his duty to investigate crimes that occurred before he took
his position. Similarly, strong commanders of units in standing fighting organiza-
tions – who correctly view themselves as the primary enforcer of the laws and
customs of war – would rarely think that violations which occurred before they
assumed command were not their responsibility. This view may change, however,
when the analysis turns to irregular forces that tend to operate more under a cult of
personality or the moral authority of an individual human or cause that is embod-
ied in an individual human rather than under the guise of sovereignty. Even in
those conflicts the requirement of de facto control when notice was gained by the
superior is enough to properly contain the doctrine from unlawful expansions that
could be argued to violate the nullem crimen sine lege principle. More to the point,
the dissenting position presents the strongest likelihood of inducing compliance by
creating an incentive structure for an incoming non-state actor to affirmatively
investigate and enforce the laws and customs of war.
5.2 Recent applications
Three recent cases are illustrative of the jurisprudential trends that threaten to un-
dermine a viable form of superior responsibility. These cases represent the closest
approximation to the majority of cases that are likely to enter courts in the near
future because of their similarities to those conflicts that have recently and are
likely to continue to be waged. Each of these cases is from a different tribunal to
cast a wide net over the jurisprudence. Each case is fairly recent to show an up-to-
date picture of the jurisprudence. Factually, each of these cases present similar
problems for the judges, each case is essentially a commander (or local leader) of a
decentralized fighting organization that is charged with crimes committed by sub-
ordinates. The decentralized fighting organizations presented by the cases align
with the fighting organizations that have generally developed over the last twenty
years to fight non-internationalized conflicts and therefore present the most indica-
tive picture of what future litigation will likely encapsulate.
5.2.1 Musema
Further expanding the applicability of command responsibility to civilians, the ICTR
Trial Chamber, in Musema, applied command responsibility in an industrial set-
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ting.130 Musema was employed as the Director of the Gisovu Tea Factory and was
convicted when the court found that he acted criminally as a commander-in-fact of
tea factory workers by virtue of his official position as factory boss and his actual
economic domination of those in his employ.131 The genocidal acts took place in
and around the area of the tea factory and Musema’s employees participated with a
variety of other perpetrators in the genocide. After reviewing the facts, the court
explicitly endorsed the principle that ‘a civilian superior may be charged with su-
perior responsibility only where he has effective control, be it de jure or merely de
facto, over the persons committing violations of international humanitarian law’.132
In Musema, the decisive determinant of the superior-subordinate relationship
turned on a simple formulaic ability of the superior to prevent or punish the crime.
The relationship of authority was deemed to run strictly along the lines of em-
ployer to employee. Although there are other subjective criteria that may be, and
are, taken into account by trial chambers, the ultimate determination that there was
or was not a relationship between the superior and the criminal subordinate de-
pends on whether the superior possessed the ability to prevent or punish the
crimes.133 ‘Proof of superior responsibility requires conclusive evidence of the ac-
tual exercise of command and control over an identifiable group of subordinates.’134
Trial chambers have taken other criteria into account, but seemingly only as sec-
ondary determinations to bolster their findings on the ability to prevent or punish.
These include: the formality of appointment of superior; the power of superior to
issue orders; the positive effect of superior’s orders (compliance history by subor-
dinates); a showing of greater discipline by subordinates in presence of superior;
the capacity to transmit reports up chain of command; a high public profile (evi-
denced by public appearances or statements, participation in peace negotiations).135
The superior must be shown to have had effective control at the time the crimes
were committed by the subordinate.136
130. Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement, paras. 880-882 (27 Janu-
ary 2000).
131. Ibid., at paras. 873, 880.
132. Ibid., at paras. 141, 148.
133. See e.g., Blaški Appeal Judgement, para. 69; Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 491; Strugar
Trial Judgement, para. 366; Halilovi Trial Judgement, para. 63; AFRC Trial Judgement para. 1653.
134. AFRC Trial Judgement para. 1659.
135. Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 312.
136. Ntagurera Trial Judgement para. 628; Semanza Trial Judgement paras. 402, 415; Ori  Trial
Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 314; see also AFRC Trial Judgement para. 1673; ‘The crimes detailed in
the factual findings were committed prior to the Accused Brima’s assumption of command. The ICTY
Appeals Chamber in Hadžihasanovi  held that there is no support in customary international law for
the proposition that a commander can be held responsible for crimes committed by a subordinate prior
to his or her assumption of command.’; citing Hadžihasanovi  Appeal Decision on Command Respon-
sibility paras. 45-46. Superiors are also responsible when their subordinates commit crimes with any
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Despite evidence introduced that Musema appeared to be the leader of groups
of ‘soldiers, guards, Interahamwe, tea factory workers who were wearing “Usine à
thé Gisovu” caps, uniforms and tea leaves, and gendarmes who had come from
Gisovu, Gishyita and Kibuye in array of vehicles including a green and a blue
Daihatsu from the tea factory,’137 Musema was held responsible only for the acts of
his direct employees. The court ruled that:
‘[I]n relation to other members of the population of Kibuye Préfecture, including thé
villageois plantation workers, while the Chamber is satisfied that such individuals per-
ceived Musema as a figure of authority and as someone who wielded considerable
power in the region, it is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the evi-
dence presented to it that Musema did, in fact, exercise de jure power and de facto
control over these individuals.138
5.2.2 Ori
Naser Ori  was a former police officer charged by the ICTY Prosecutor with crimes
amounting to murder and mistreatment of prisoners under his care and wanton
destruction of civilian property not justified by military necessity by forces under
his control.139 This article will focus on the wanton destruction of property charges
as they directly illustrate the jurisprudential problems associated with imposing
command responsibility analysis using the current analytical templates. In the ear-
lier Halilovi  judgment, the ICTY maintained a strong emphasis on the factual
proof of effective control, requiring the acquittal of defendant commanders when
it cannot be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that they had exercised effective
control sufficient to establish the requisite superior/subordinate relationship.140 The
Srebrenica Armed Forces, which Ori  eventually commanded, began as isolated
pockets of armed groups that were eventually organized into a larger, more com-
prehensive group of Bosnian Muslim fighters known as the Drina Division.141
The Drina Division was eventually integrated fully into the 2nd Corps of the
ABiH (the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina).142 The fighters were engaged with Ser-
bian forces from at least 1992, but full integration into the ABiH with clear hierar-
other valid 7.1 mode of liability, not only physical perpetration. Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82,
para. 305.
137. Musema Trial Judgement, supra n. 130, para. 491.
138. Ibid., para. 881.
139. Prosecutor v. Naser Ori , Case No. IT-03-68-PT (Third Amended Indictment, 30 June 2005),
at <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/ind/en/ori-3ai050630e.pdf>.
140. Halilovi , supra n. 100, para. 54 (16 November 2005); ‘upholding the applicability of the
principle of command responsibility, but finding that the prosecution did not meet its factual burden.’
141. Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 156.
142. Ibid., para. 171.
44 M.A. Newton and C. Kuhlman
chical lines going all the way to Sarejevo did not come about until January 1995.143
The Trial Chamber notes that although there was eventual integration into the ABiH,
the ‘independence of a number of these [local cell] leaders asserted in the early
days of the conflict never weakened before demilitarization.’144 Throughout this
period the organizations were cellular, localized defense forces that were margin-
ally integrated. Communications between these individual groups and to higher
levels of the ABiH was infrequent.145 Assistance was rarely supplied from one cell
to another and there seems to have been no higher level involvement in the cell’s
activities prior to March 1993.146 Participation in the localized defense cells was
voluntary, and most fighters resided with their families or in temporary accommo-
dations.147 The cells appeared to fulfill dual roles of localized defense against Ser-
bian incursions as well as many duties traditionally associated with civilian police.148
Ori , as nominal commander of these units spread throughout the villages sur-
rounding Srebrenica, was charged with superior responsibility for their actions.
The Trial Chamber began its legal analysis by giving credence to the most cited
purpose for the doctrine: ‘it aims at obliging commanders to ensure that subordi-
nates do not violate international humanitarian law, either by harmful acts or by
omitting a protective duty’.149 The Trial Chamber found Ori  guilty of superior
responsibility for the maltreatment crimes, based upon the standard elements of
superior responsibility.150 For all the charged crimes, the chamber found that the
superior-subordinate relationship was supported by the de jure authority.151 The
problem for the ICTY Prosecutor was that the Chamber found that the Ori ’s de
facto control did not extend beyond the villages in the immediate vicinity of
Srebrenica and therefore Ori  was acquitted on the wanton destruction charges.152
The Trial Chamber’s rationale for its conclusion that there was a lack of effec-
tive control which mitigated Ori ’s de jure authority is very interesting and may
have long-standing implications.153 The main point of opacity in the Chamber’s
decision is that it is not clear what evidence the Chamber relied on in finding that
there was a lack of effective control as the Judgment documented many factors
143. Ibid., paras. 173, 181.
144. Ibid., para. 161.
145. Ibid., paras. 168, 171, 202.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid., para. 138.
148. Ibid., para. 249.
149. Ibid., para. 301.
150. Ibid., para. 578.
151. Ibid., para. 528.
152. Ibid., paras. 528, 716.
153. Ibid., para. 699; see also Delali  Trial Judgement, paras. 188-195, ‘holding that the basis for
the superior-subordinate relationship, whether de jure or de facto must be also supported by effective
control over the particular subordinates who committed the crimes.’
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from which Ori ’s effective control of many of the subordinate units might have
been determined. The Chamber found that Ori  ‘issued orders, including appoint-
ments of leaders of local groups, and charged specific persons with a specific task.’154
The attacks referred to by the Chamber were in fact executed and ‘would not have
been possible without a certain degree of co-ordination among local Bosnian Mus-
lim fighting groups participating in the attacks.’155 The Chamber also finds that
there was limited communication between the cells; that Ori  would travel freely
to various parts of the district where he could hear fighting; that Ori  maintained a
wide sphere of command, and a high degree of respect; that Ori  was elected by
local leaders of the various defense cells; that Ori  was responsible for communi-
cations with Serbians, with higher command; and that Ori  held himself out as
commander of all the forces in the area in local meetings, in public speeches, and
in a book he wrote after the conflict.156
Despite all of these factors the Chamber found that Ori ’s degree of effective
control over the disparate local defence fighting groups was hit or miss and that the
primary loyalty of all the fighters was to the cellular, local leader.157 ‘The picture
that emerges from the evidence is not one of an organised army with a fully func-
tioning command structure, but one of pockets of desperate men willing to fight,
mainly to defend themselves, that grouped together around trusted leaders, who
could provide them with a better chance of survival.’158 Even when Ori  was present
during attacks, the Chamber was not willing to attribute effective control, they
seem to insist on tactical level control over the subordinate units to be actually
exercised by Ori  before they were willing to find effective control: ‘the Trial Cham-
ber is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his mere presence during the
attack is indicative of effective control in the attack: there is no evidence that he
was coordinating the attack or issuing orders’.159
Scrutinizing the facts, the court found that while Ori  held a technical title as
military commander, some soldiers nominally beneath him in the command struc-
ture did not regard him as their actual commander-in-fact.160 Fiercely loyal to their
respective local commanders, these soldiers ‘had to rely on local leaders, some of
whom not only chose to act independently but considered [Ori ] inexperienced
154. Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 700.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid., paras. 701-704.
157. Ibid., para. 706, ‘The Trial Chamber finds the Accused credible when he stated during his
Interview that although he was elected commander, fighters were primarily loyal to their respective
commanders, and he was thus unable to command all of the fighting groups in the field, especially
since he was not always present during all the attacks.’
158. Ibid., para. 707.
159. Ibid., para. 712.
160. Ibid., paras. 707, 770.
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and scorned his authority.’161 These two holdings – that primary loyalty to a local
leader can cut against a higher commander’s effective control and that tactical
level control should be exercised in order to support a finding of effective control
– both present problems when combined with the realities of current and foresee-
able conflicts. The tactics ascribed to the local forces around Srebrenica are remi-
niscent of those used by non-state actors, warlords, and neighborhood thugs in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other current conflict zones. In order to evade a find-
ing of superior responsibility all a commander needs to do is to organize his subor-
dinate units in cells with primary loyalty to the cellular commanders and thereafter
fail to exercise tactical level control beyond an initial planning and coordination of
the attack. The failure of portions of the ICTY case against Naser Ori  despite his
high-level command position illustrates the difficulty of proving effective control
over hierarchically distant relationships.162 Ultimately, the court engaged in a situ-
ation-by-situation analysis of the charges, acquitting Ori  in those instances where,
despite his efforts to assert authority, he did not possess effective control over the
actual perpetrators, and thus the requisite superior/subordinate relationship was
insufficiently established.163
5.2.3 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
The AFRC Judgement from the Special Court for Sierra Leone is important for
three reasons: it is one of the most recent pronouncements by a Tribunal on supe-
rior responsibility, it is the first Tribunal not under the authority of the combined
ICTY/ICTR Appeals Chamber to rule on superior responsibility, and most impor-
tantly it is factually the most predictive of future conflicts that international jurists
will confront. Although the AFRC began as a splinter of the Sierra Leonean Army,
they adopted a looser organization more akin to the Revolutionary United Front.
The AFRC operated as most standard guerilla forces do: with localized, isolated
attacks on tactical positions to acquire supplies followed by a coordinated attack
on a strategic target which is used to leverage for its peace dividend. The Chamber
notes that ‘[t]he doctrine of effective control was traditionally applied to com-
161. Ibid., para. 770.
162. Ibid., paras. 696, 700.
163. Ibid., paras. 706-782, ‘finding in one instance, ‘in spite of efforts to bring them together
under an effective sole command, the local groups remained relatively independent and voluntary. The
picture that emerges from the evidence is not one of an organised army with a fully functioning com-
mand structure, but one of pockets of desperate men willing to fight, mainly to defend themselves, that
grouped together around trusted leaders, who could provide them with a better chance of survival.2000
There are indications that effective control was at times absent even within the various groups them-
selves.2001 Furthermore, most of the destruction was caused by the civilians who followed the fight-
ers and who no one was able to control.
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manders in regular armies, which tend to be highly structured and disciplined forces.
The AFRC was less trained, resourced, organised and staffed than a regular army.
However, it mimicked one.’164 The AFRC maintained a command structure as well
as ‘[r]ules and systems facilitating the exercise of control’.165 These rules were
largely enforced not by de jure authority vested in a commander’s position by a
state, but rather by the force of personality of the individual commander in combi-
nation with the loyalty of subordinate commanders (which were often obtained
and sustained by monetary means).166
The Chamber adopted a unique approach to its analysis of superior responsibil-
ity. The Chamber seems to implicitly acknowledge the link between responsible
command and command responsibility by imputing the analysis of whether the
AFRC was a military organization (which seemingly hinged on whether there was
a responsible command) into the individual criminal responsibility of the specific
commanders. Although there is no explicit analysis of this linkage, as discussed
above this is the most logical way to analyze the problem, especially in non-tradi-
tional conflicts. There was a battle of the experts between the prosecution military
expert and the defence military expert in determining whether the AFRC was a
military organization.167 Each expert adopted its own criteria for the analysis that
was based on their military history rather than on any legal criteria.168 This pro-
duced a laundry list of factual elements for the Chamber to analyze.169 Ultimately,
however the court rejected the majority of the elements and settled on three criteria
which, if satisfied, would mean that the AFRC was an organized military force – no
matter that it was an irregular force – hence its commanders maintained a superior
relationship over subordinate units sufficient to impute criminal accountability:170
164. Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007, para. 539
(hereinafter AFRC Trial Judgement), at <http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ArmedForcesRevolutionary
CouncilAFRCComplete/tabid/106/Default.aspx>.
165. Ibid., para. 539.
166. Ibid., para. 539.
167. Ibid., paras. 541-543.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid., para. 554. The experts also considered whether the characteristics typically present in
a traditional army were exhibited by the AFRC. The characteristics which they discussed included the
intelligence process; communications system; lessons learnt system; recruitment and training; system
for promotions and appointments; logistic supply; repair and maintenance of equipment; medical sys-
tem; pay or reward system for soldiers; religious welfare system and fundraising and finance system.
In the Trial Chamber’s view it is of doubtful value to examine some of these characteristics, since they
are inapplicable to most irregular militaries. For instance, instead of a pay or reward system for sol-
diers, AFRC commander Johnny Paul Koroma announced ‘Operation Pay Yourself’ in February 1998,
encouraging soldiers to loot civilian property since the AFRC could not pay them wages. Other char-
acteristics – intelligence process, communications system, lessons learnt system, recruitment and training
and medical system – were present in the AFRC only to a limited extent.
170. Ibid., para. 556; Both experts ultimately agreed that the AFRC was an irregular military
force, that is, not a traditional army. Neither Colonel Iron [Prosecution Military Expert] nor Major-
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‘In the Trial Chamber’s view, three of the structural factors which the experts consid-
ered are generic features which are critical to facilitating control and may be equally
present in irregular armed groups such as the AFRC. These factors are a functioning
chain of command, a sufficiently developed planning and orders process, and a strong
disciplinary system.’171
It is this three-prong test – functioning chain of command, orders and planning
process, and the presence of a disciplinary system – that is the most workable test
for effective control while being the most in line with the legal requirements of
treaty law on superior responsibility.172 The one major caveat that the Chamber
places on the finding of superior responsibility is a logical one, they say that ‘[p]roof
of superior responsibility requires conclusive evidence of the actual exercise of
command and control over an identifiable group of subordinates’.173 Of course, the
precise proof that the AFRC bench would require is that which proved insufficient
for the ICTY in Ori  due to the nature of the shifting command lines in that con-
flict. After proffering the test, the Chamber analyzed the facts in light of this spe-
cific test for superior-subordinate relationship throughout each phase of the
conflict.174 It is not clear from treaty law whether the relationship should be broken
into phases of the conflict or whether a more appropriate analysis would be a more
holistic analysis taking into account the general presence or absence of a superior-
subordinate relationship.
Some of the difference between the holdings (primarily between Ori  and the
AFRC) may be that the AFRC Trial Chamber is just more willing to find guilt over
the accused. While the Ori  Chamber offers the loyalty of subordinates to local-
ized leaders as almost a complete mitigation against a finding of effective control,
the AFRC Chamber finds that the loyalty of subordinate commanders to higher
commanders only raises the duty placed upon commanders to ensure that subordi-
nates do not violate the laws and customs of war.175 More importantly, the AFRC
General Prins [Defence Military Expert] are experts in irregular military conflict. However, an irregu-
lar force can also be an organised force, and it can act in a structured and co-ordinated way. The fact
that the AFRC was not a traditional army does not per se permit inferences to be drawn regarding the
ability of the AFRC commanders to effectively control their men. Insofar as a developed structure
exists within an organisation, this is an important indicium of the superior’s ability to exercise effec-
tive control and weight must be given to it accordingly. The Trial Chamber therefore considers that the
conclusion of the experts’ reports is the starting point for an analysis of the structure of the AFRC.’
171. Ibid., para. 557.
172. Notably, the disciplinary system merely needs to be operational, it does not have to be used to
suppress or punish criminal activity, ruling otherwise would be plainly illogical.
173. AFRC Trial Judgement , supra n. 164, para. 1659.
174. Ibid., paras. 1723-1744.
175. Ibid., para. 1886; ‘Evidence of a subordinate’s unpredictability or irresponsibility in no way
vitiates a superior’s responsibility to exercise authority over that subordinate. Rather, it is exactly this
type of situation to which a superior is under an obligation to respond by putting in place measures to
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Chamber seems to align itself, whether purposely or by coincidence, almost pre-
cisely with the requirements of treaty law while accounting for modern battlefield
realities.
5.3 The deceptive expediency of Joint Criminal Enterprise
Faced with the welter of opinions related to effective control, the modern evolution
of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) provides a tempting alternative to prosecutors
and judges. JCE and Superior Responsibility represent the tectonic plates of indi-
vidual responsibility, and the friction between them can create zones of impunity
even for patently guilty commanders. Prosecutors at the ICTY have tended to avoid
framing charges in terms of command/superior responsibility in favor of more far-
reaching, but correspondingly more imprecise JCE theories.176 Although Cham-
bers have often upheld individual responsibility both for personal liability and for
that inherent in a command position more precision in the charging decisions would
be preferable.177 The evidentiary basis for proving acts of omission is likely to be
much weaker in a JCE case, whereas acts of omission are at the heart of superior
responsibility analysis.178
prevent the commission of crimes by a subordinate or to punish such a subordinate once such crimes
have been committed.’
176. M. Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity’, 105 Columbia
LR (2005) pp. 1751, 1774-1784.
177. Celibi i Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 743.
178. See Prosecutor v. Jean Mpambara, Case No, ICTR-01-65-T, Trial Chamber Judgement,
11 September 2006, paras. 25-27 (case charged as a joint criminal enterprise to commit genocide
resulted in acquittal on all charges), at <http://69.94.11.53/default.htm>. 25. Liability for an omission
may arise in a third, fundamentally different context: where the accused is charged with a duty to
prevent or punish others from committing a crime. The culpability arises not by participating in the
commission of a crime, but by allowing another person to commit a crime which the accused has a
duty to prevent or punish. 26. The circumstances in which such a duty has been recognized in interna-
tional criminal law are limited indeed. As stated by the Appeals Chamber in Tadi : ‘The basic assump-
tion must be that in international law as much as in national systems, the foundation of criminal
responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for
acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla
poena sine culpa)’. 27. Article 6 (3) of the Statute creates an exception to this principle in relation to
a crime about to be, or which has been, committed by a subordinate. Where the superior knew or had
reason to know of the crime, he or she must ‘take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof’. In Blaski , the Appeals Chamber extended this liability
by finding that a superior could also be liable under 6 (1) for the mistreatment by his subordinates of
prisoners used as human shields, not because he had given an order to do so, but because, as comman-
dant, he was under a direct ‘legal duty … to care for the persons under the control of [his] subordinates.
Wilful failure to discharge such a duty may incur criminal responsibility pursuant to Article [6 (1)] of
the Statute in the absence of a positive act’. The Geneva Conventions were relied upon as imposing
specific positive obligations on the accused.
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Furthermore, the location of the accused within the chain of command of the
perpetrating organization should be highly determinative of the appropriate charg-
ing decision. If the accused is at the pinnacle of the organization then it may be a
more appropriate fulfillment of the Tribunal’s narrative function to charge only
superior responsibility for those crimes which there is a lack of proof that the de-
fendant ordered, instigated or directly participated in the criminal activity. Perpe-
trators who are merely tangential to a larger organizational chart, such as specific
politicians who are unlikely to exercise authoritative control over other perpetra-
tors, might best be charged using a JCE theory. Finally there are likely times when
dual charging is appropriate, for those in the middle such as high level command-
ers whose subordinates may have perpetrated part of the crime base but as a sub-
stantial contribution to a larger criminal element for which the commander was
operating as part of a major JCE.
The middle of the spectrum does present problems if prosecutors are not careful
to isolate which specifics of the crime base were perpetrated by the subordinates as
a matter of superior responsibility and which specifics were perpetrated by co-
commanders’ subordinates (with a JCE form of participation). ‘If … a superior has
functioned as a member of a collegiate body with authority shared among various
members, the power or authority actually devolved on an accused may be assessed
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the cumulative effect of the accused’s
various functions.’179
Charging decisions have shifted according to the rigidity of hierarchy within the
perpetrating organization. The more the fighting organization looks like an organ-
ized westernized military, the more superior responsibility should be looked at by
prosecutors. When the fighting organization is more akin to a cellular terrorist or-
ganization or non-state entity with little top-down organization or control, then
JCE can be a much more attractive option for prosecutors. In this setting, an ill-
advised decision to charge JCE in lieu of command responsibility may well result
in acquittal by a court applying its principles in good faith. For example, the ICTY
could not conclude from the available evidence that three key members of the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) participated in an ongoing Joint Criminal Enter-
prise to ‘unlawfully remove and mistreat Serbian civilians or mistreat Kosovar
Albanian and Kosovar Roma/Egyptian civilians, and other civilians, who were, or
were perceived to have been, collaborators with the Serbian forces or otherwise
not supporting the KLA.’180 The ICTR also acquitted Jean Mpambara following
179. Ori  Trial Judgement, supra n. 82, para. 313; Brd-anin Trial Judgement, para. 277, referenc-
ing Bagilishema Appeal Judgement, para. 51, endorsing the findings in Musema Trial Judgement,
para. 135 and Staki Trial Judgement, para. 494.
180. Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, et al., Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement, para. 478 (3 April
2008).
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the charges that he participated in a JCE to commit genocide.181 Analysis of these
cases along the lines of command authority might well have produced differing
results more in accordance with the expectations of the victims for justice.
JCE remains a popular method of charging high level leaders (presumably182
because of the lower mens rea requirements and the expansive crime base that can
be handled in one case).183 Its overuse has the potential for creating a standard of
amorphous strict liability, but its effects in the context of a command relationship
are more insidious. In fact, any position of superior authority in which subordi-
nates are expected to obey the guidance of the higher authority and in which a
collective unit functions as an extension of the will of the commander will, almost
by definition constitute a form of JCE. This is an important but subtle point, that is
often overlooked in the technical legal discussions over the scope and membership
of a particular JCE.
The overlap of a JCE onto a military or paramilitary organizational structure
tends to erode the perception of the participants in an armed conflict that the act of
taking command in and of itself conveys an abiding obligation to ensure compli-
ance with the laws and customs of war. Moreover, the expressive value of the
proceedings and the substantive legal basis of convictions will be undermined by
undue reliance on JCE as the form of convenience rather than one of appropriate-
ness. Both theories remain viable and can be charged either separately or together.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of command/superior responsibility should remain the
preferred theory when it applies. Abandonment of the core concepts of command
responsibility risk the creation of an inaccurate historical narrative that a campaign
of criminality was the byproduct of a small group of like-minded criminals (the
JCE) rather than the failure of commanders and those effectively acting as com-
manders at all levels to enforce the laws and customs of war. Prosecutors must
remain faithful to their duty to marshall available evidence of what actually hap-
pened rather than shaping that evidence to selectively apply it to the theory of
convenience (JCE). More to the point, an overreliance on JCE as a methodology
for holding commanders and other superiors responsible runs the risk of eroding
the effects that the law should have in reinforcing the affirmative duty of com-
manders and superiors to exercise leadership aimed at protecting the fundamental
values of the jus in bello.
181. Mpambara, supra n. 178.
182. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 17 September
2003, para. 171.
183. A.M. Danner and J.S., ‘Martinez , Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’, 93 California LR (2005) p. 107,
continuing that of the 42 indictments filed at the ICTY between 25 June 2001 and 1 January 2004 64%
relied exclusively on a JCE mode of liability.
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6. THE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY OF ATROCITY
Commanders who field fighting organizations will always do so in a manner that
permits them to control the violence. When they do not, their subordinates are
liable to turn on them. But even where personal loyalty is high, the commander
will need to justify a place of importance in the organization. This only happens in
contexts where he retains the ability to control the organization. Therein lies the
conceptual basis for imposing criminality on a leader who fails to use that position
and authority to implement and enforce the laws and customs of war. A close look
at how commanders field organizations, how they train their organizations and
how they plan and conduct operations on the battlefield shows that it complex
operations, and almost every atrocity, can rarely be executed without the com-
mander. Commanders are the critical path to being able to form the fighting organi-
zation, and their organizations will be most effective – militarily – where they field
their organization with the proper control mechanisms. Mao Tse-Tung put it sim-
ply, ‘[u]norganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory’.184
An understanding of exactly how modern commanders are able to control their
subordinates on the battlefield is integral for international criminal jurists to under-
stand. Jurists who fail to appreciate the processes and protocols for controlling
subordinates may misapply otherwise valid legal principles and create an anarchic
hodgepodge of precedents that is increasingly ill suited to implementation in the
smoke and dust and fatigue of actual conflict. As a noted political scientist has
observed:
‘[I]f insurgent organizations are to be held accountable for violations of international
humanitarian law, instruments must be developed and refined to reflect the diverse
structures of these groups. The ability of the international community to influence the
behavior of a group is undoubtedly shaped by a host of factors, including the
motivations of its combatants, internal incentives within the organization, the structure
of command and control, the financing of the group, the degree of outside influence,
and the likelihood of victory … A focus on the internal structures of rebel groups
raises important questions about the efficacy of trials and tribunals as a strategy for
constraining anticivilian violence.’185
184. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 45 translated by S.B. Griffith (Champaign IL, Univer-
sity of Illinois Press 2000) p. 45.
185. J.M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge, CUP 2007)
p. 344, see also at p. 350, further emphasizing the need for a clear deterrent theory as follows: Mecha-
nisms of deterrence depend on the fact that individuals care about the future. Opportunistic groups
filled to the brim with consumers tend not to exhibit that characteristic. It is often difficult to make
sense of the command and control structure in these groups, moreover, in order to assign individual
responsibility. Although many opportunistic groups exhibit a high degree of centralization in military
command, much of the violence for which they are responsible is committed in a decentralized fashion
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Jurists must be able to realistically assess the modalities by which non-state actors
control an organization in order to create a fighting force. This understanding must
derive from a clear-eyed military reality which is in turn implemented in the proc-
esses of the law. Effective control derives from the commander’s ability to control
a fighting organization. Looking at conflict through this lens provides the prag-
matic justification for the assumption of risk theory presented in Section 7.
The doctrine of effective control should serve as the unifying theme for a com-
prehensive theory of superior responsibility that also conforms to the modern
modalities of conflict. Reform of the doctrine (and in some sense a revalidation of
the precepts of command) begins with a return to its very foundations. As the ICTY
Appeals Chamber noted in Krnojelac, it ‘cannot be overstated that, where superior
responsibility is concerned, an accused is not charged with the crimes of his subor-
dinates but with his failure to carry out his duty to exercise control’. The com-
mander must be able to field an organization; he must be able to control the
organization’s activities beyond the initial push; and he must be able to maintain
his personal viability and relevance to the situation. Each of these concerns will be
examined in this section.
6.1 How to form a fighting organization
There are three essentials paths, all of which must be satisfied, in order for an
individual to form a fighting organization. These three hold true whether the fight-
ing organization is a non-state, cellular terrorist organization or a modern armed
force from an industrialized nation. Institutionalizing a fighting organization re-
quires: fighters, materiale and an organization. Without all three of these the result
would be a political organization, a social organization or a levee en masse. It is
self-evident that fighters are required, and it follows that the very identity of the
leader may be a significant element of the ability to exercise effective control after
the onset of hostilities. Thus, while many cases will involve evidence related to the
personal charisma or authority of the leader who recruits them, some exploration is
necessary for the other two criteria.
Weapons are an essential component of a fighting organization. Often weapons
– which are a component of material – are the critical path to enabling an organiza-
tion’s violence. The flow of weapons may be the critical link in establishing effec-
tive control in a conflict zone subject to an arms embargo by other nations. The
Liberian conflict, inter alia, demonstrates that the flow of weapons can be the
critical path to enabling an organization to function. The National Patriotic Front
of Liberia’s (NPFL, which was Charles Taylor’s organization) offensive took place
as a result of a culture of indiscipline – one that goes unpunished by local, rather than national, com-
manders.
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186. B. Berkeley, ‘Liberia: Between Repression and Slaughter’, Atlantic Monthly (Dec. 1992)
p. 54.
187. IRIN News Organization, UN-OCHA, 6 September 2007, at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/news/2007/09/mil-070906-irin02.htm>. ‘The other good news for Sierra Leone is that
not only did the former rebel Revolutionary Armed Front (RUF) disarm but observers agree that with-
out weapons the organization’s command structure largely dissolved. After the death of its leader,
Foday Sankoh, in 2003 the armed group even failed to turn itself into a political party.’
188. In the 2003 Iraqi conflict the advance of the U.S. First Marine Division towards Baghdad
was put on hold temporarily until a corridor could be opened that would ensure the supply of the
combat troops with the ammunition they required. J. Coughlin and C. Kuhlman, Shooter: The Autobi-
ography of the Top-Ranked Marine Sniper (New York, St. Martin’s Press 2005) pp. 147-149.
189. The amount and ease of attaining logistics and materiale also may impact the type of organi-
zation that is formed. See Weinstein, supra n. 185, p. 7. ‘Factors that raise or lower the barriers to
organization by insurgent leaders – in particular whether material resources to finance warfare can be
easily mobilized without civilian consent – shape the types of individuals who elect to participate, the
sorts of organizations that emerge to fight civil wars, and the strategies of violence that develop in
practice.’
only after Charles Taylor’s forces were able to put weapons in the hands of fighters
in Liberia. One NPFL fighter told the story in this manner: ‘[a]s the NPFL came in
we didn’t even have to act. People came to us and said, “give me a gun. How can I
kill the man who killed my mother?”’186 The provision of arms also made the criti-
cal difference in Sierra Leone as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) gained an
ability to fight collectively. IRIN noted recently that the RUF essentially disinte-
grated when the arms were taken out of fighters’ hands by the Disarmament, De-
mobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) program and when the borders to Sierra
Leone were effectively shut off from resupply of weapons.187 It is no overstate-
ment to recognize that the flow of weapons may very well be the essential evidence
needed to establish the very existence of a command relationship such as that re-
quired by the first prong of the AFRC framework.
In modern professionalized military establishments, logisticians are integral
components to the commander’s planning process. This is because the military
operations drive the logistics. In staff planning rooms the commander and the op-
erations cell generally plan an operation first and then tell the logistics cell what is
happening so that they can supply it. Only if the logistician is unable to supply it
will the operations have to be modified. Planned military operations are often stalled
because of a logistical incapacity,188 but for the majority of modern militaries the
numerous methods with which to supply the fighters with logistics reduces the
reliance upon any one path. Where fighters can be resupplied via airdrop, helicop-
ters or roads, the military commanders can plan their operations and to think about
their battlespace virtually untethered from their logistical train.
However, for the commanders of non-state, decentralized forces, logistics is the
critical path to battlefield success.189 ‘A good supply system is of basic importance
Theory of ‘effective control’ 55
190. Che Guevarra, On Guerrilla Warfare, at <http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/slatta/hi216/documents/
che.htm>.
191. See <http://charlestaylortrial.org/2008/01/15/koker-testifies-about-operation-no-living-thing-
and-arms-deliveries-from-liberia-to-sierra-leone-defense-counsel-begins-koker-cross-examination/>.
192. D.H. Johnson, ‘The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism’, in
C. Clapham, ed., African Guerrillas (Bloomington IN, Indiana University Press 1998) p. 58.
193. See Weinstein, supra n. 185, p. 76.
194. Ibid., p. 10. ‘The membership profile of a rebellion then affects its internal organization and
the strategies it pursues in war. Rebel leaders confront a series of difficult choices as they design their
organizations and engage civilians. … Activist movements can maintain internal discipline by draw-
ing on established norms and networks enabling them to decentralize power within their armies; op-
portunistic rebellions must permit indiscipline in order to maintain their membership, while holding on
to the reins of military strategy. … Structures of internal control and external governance shape the
to the guerrilla band.’190 Commanders of decentralized fighting organizations must
take logistics matters into account at the earliest stages of planning because deliv-
ery of those logistics often requires more of a military commitment, more time and
is more critical than for other militaries. Although individual cells in the fighting
organization can plan and train on their own, they will not be able to fight without
weapons and ammunition. This creates a convenient set of circumstances for com-
manders of these organizations. They are able to retain control of the violence
simply by throttling when and where weapons enter the hands of their fighters. In
these organizations the commander becomes the logistics officer, at times keeping
the arms and ammunition in his abode.191
Controlling the violence of the subordinates is simple, when you want to attack
you point your cell towards where it is to attack and then put a weapon and enough
bullets for the attack in their hands. The fighters attack like they have been trained
to do and expend all their bullets. At the end of the attack the fighters are left with
little to do since they have few bullets, and suddenly they become metaphorically
chained again until the commander decides his next point of attack. Although this
is a simplified example, it shows that in certain circumstances the provision of
materiale may show, ipso facto, control over subordinates, especially if there is a
lack of the other methods of control listed throughout this article. It is via this
method that many external patrons are able to exert a varying amount of influence
over their subjects. Ethiopia mandated that the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
adopt a unified command structure with John Garang in command in return for
their support.192 The Rhodesians similarly mandated much of Renamo’s strategy
and organization and did not give the Mozambique rebel movement much flexibil-
ity in the implementation of its taskings.193
The provision of arms and ammunition is not in itself enough to warrant a prima
facie finding of effective control. There must also be some level of hierarchy, a
disciplinary system and an orders process which define the organizational compo-
nent of the group.194 If the provision of arms and ammunition to a group is the
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capacity of rebel groups to discipline the behavior of their members and influence the expectations of
civilians about the types of behavior they will see when the rebels come to town.’
195. W. Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (New Brunswick NJ, Trans-
action Publishers 1998) pp. 304-305.
196. See e.g., S. Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Islamic Terror
(New Brunswick NJ, Transaction Publishers 2005) p. 178; ‘The war in Afghanistan saliently reflects
the conflict between the state-oriented concept and “war machine” and the nomadic concept and “war
machine”. The Soviet union and the Communist regime in Kabul expressed the vertical, graded state-
oriented concept, on philosophical, conceptual, and practical levels, while the Afghan mujahidin, as-
sisted by the “internacionale” of volunteers from all over the Muslim world, like Bin Laden, expressed
the concept of the nomadic “war machine”. This machine was built horizontally and was composed of
scores of organizations and groups lacking a regulated or permanent structure and without define
procedures of cooperation, whose only loose link was the joint goal – defeat of the communist regime
and banishment of the Soviet Union’s forces from Afghanistan.’
197. H. Behrend, ‘War in Northern Uganda: The Holy Spirit Movements of Alice Lakwena, Severino
Lukoya and Joseph Kony (1986-1997)’, in Clapham, supra n. 192, pp. 107-118.
198. Weinstein, supra n. 185, p. 134.
difference between a fighting organization and a political party, then a modicum of
organizational capacity is the difference between a fighting organization and a mob.
The Palestine cellular units of the late 1960s and early 1970s demonstrate this
because they were unable to affect and coordinate their violence because of the
lack of adaptability.195 These three components all work together to enable the
commander to impose his will on his subordinates. Without a hierarchy then there
is no efficient way that he will be able to communicate his will to subordinates;
without a disciplinary system he cannot ensure that violations of his orders are
sanctioned; without an orders process he cannot effectively disseminate his orders
to individual fighters.
The level of hierarchy required for a commander to impose his will on his or-
ganization will vary depending on the circumstances.196 In cellular organizations
the central cell may communicate infrequently with a large number of subordi-
nates. For example, the Holy Spirit Movement in Northern Uganda had only three
line companies of fighters, but each of these companies maintained between three
and thirty platoons.197 They may communicate only when there are changes to a
plan or when the plan is to be executed. This limitation of communication and
individual control enables the commander to maintain a greater number of subor-
dinates. Where there is a greater level of tactical control over subordinates a com-
mander will not have time to be able to communicate with each subordinate and
will usually reduce the number of individuals he communicates with and the or-
ganization will become more pyramidal. ‘In coordinating the activities of multiple
agents, clear lines of hierarchical control help leaders to operate effectively in en-
vironments of uncertainty and limited information. Top-down leadership allows a
group to control multiple arms working in unison toward common objectives.’198
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201. Weinstein, supra n. 185, p. 127. ‘Troops in the National Resistance Army risked serious
punishment for any acts that contravened the formal code of conduct adopted by its High Command … .’
No matter the design of the system, there must be some level of hierarchy. Those in
the hierarchy will provide the authoritarian enabling mechanisms that the fighters
will require to enable their violence.
A disciplinary system is also a vital requirement for a commander to ensure that
his will is carried out by the organization. Mao contextualized the dilemma simply,
‘Victory in guerrilla war is conditioned upon keeping the membership pure and
clean.’199 The commander must be able to sanction violations of his will.200 The
commander must first be able to know when his orders are not followed. However,
once violations of superior orders are made known to the superior he will necessar-
ily take action to ensure that future violations of his orders are not undertaken.
Controlling out of bounds behavior is the only way the commander will be able to
ensure that his organization stays in the bounds he establishes for them. ‘Disci-
pline’ in many non-state organizations may entail a withholding of benefits from a
battle such as an enforced handover of loot or the provision of sex slaves to more
compliant subordinates. In other circumstances this may be a withholding of the
ability to wage battle until the commander is ready for it, like above. In still others,
the disciplinary system may take the form of criminal sanctions.201 It is of no im-
port which tactic the commander takes to ensure that his organization is controlled;
it is of no import what the behavior is that is out of bounds, because those bounds
are established by the commander; the only thing of import is whether there is the
ability to sanction out-of-bounds behavior. That is the essence of effective control.
For if the commander cannot sanction violations of his will then his ability to im-
pose his will on his subordinates only exists to the extent that his fighters are loyal
to him in the face of many competing obligations.
Finally, the sine qua non of any organization is some orders process by which
the commander’s will gets carried out. Over time, the laws of warfare have become
the lodestone of professionalism and the guiding point for professional military
forces the world over. The will of the commander, operating under the overarching
parameters of the law of armed conflict, provides the standards that separate trained
professionals from a lawless rabble. Orders from the top are the indispensable
element of establishing the corporate consciousness that will be examined in detail
below. The commander must have the ability to direct his subordinates or the or-
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202. See Weinstein, supra n. 185, p. 134. ‘While one could imagine that an organization without
hierarchy might be difficult for a government to defeat, a fully decentralized structure would also
make it more difficult for rebels to take on the tasks of governance fundamental to guerrilla warfare
and the effective rule of the state should they succeed in battle.’
ganization is simply a group of people operating like a gaggle of fish where no
decisions are made and reactions are based upon inputs from the lateral line. With-
out the ability to disseminate the orders of the commander, effective control is a
meaningless concept. These situations, though, are not very prevalent. In leaderless,
rudderless situations, the violence cannot be sustained because there is a dearth of
the enabling factors which are the difference between violence and cowardice.202
From the military leader’s perspective these are the three critical paths to a
commander’s ability to formulate a fighting organization. Without fighters, materiale
and an organizational capacity the commander will be in charge of nothing besides
his immediate surroundings. Only a limited amount of violence can be sustained in
this environment. Yet, even a few individuals may be able to unleash violence that
affects entire regions if there is a modicum of organization, material and fighters.
6.2 Training and corporate culture
Training is not a function of a commander’s ability to field a fighting organization,
but it is a function of how well that organization will function. Training can be
broken down into three components: mechanical training, tactical training and cul-
tural training. A commander’s ability to utilize various units will mostly depend on
the training levels in each of these areas of his subordinates. Those units who are
untrained will be unable to perform certain missions and those units that are highly
trained will be very flexible and will be able to perform many differing missions
for the commander.
Mechanical training includes a rudimentary proficiency in the weapons that the
individual fighter is responsible for deploying on the battlefield whether these be
pistols, rifles or sophisticated aircraft. It may also include development of some
technical skills such as driving, use of satellite location devices, intelligence gath-
ering methods, or communications systems. Mechanical training impacts on the
individual’s ability to perform the task assigned, and the efficiency of the unit de-
rives from the aggregate level of skill of its members. Once the individual fighter
has achieved mechanical proficiency the fighter can be deployed to combat. How-
ever, the fighter is not likely to be truly effective without other, higher levels of
training that only happen after mechanical training is completed. The second phase
of training a military unit focuses on tactical training. For individual riflemen this
will include movement training, firing commands and other battlefield survival
techniques and procedures of the given organization. If the fighter’s job is to com-
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205. Weinstein, supra n. 185, p. 141.
206. See D. Pool, ‘The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’, in Clapham, supra n. 192, pp. 19-25.
207. See P. Woodward, The Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations (London,
Tauris 1996) p. 107; ‘The end of conflict in Eritrea had left a political legacy very different from that
in Ethiopia. Instead of a coalition of forces led by one small remote region, Eritrea had a unified
command which had asserted ever more control over the territory during the course of the war. At the
municate or to operate a crew-served weapon like a heavy machine gun then the
training will vary a bit but will generally include those techniques and procedures
that individual fighters receive. This training allows the unit to fight as a collective
entity and enables the commander of the unit to be able to control the violence of
his subordinates. It is this training which embeds the habits and operant condition-
ing of combat that will enable the fighters to kill when their forebrains shut off and
their midbrains assume cognizance.203 Tactical training conditions fighters to an
understanding of the battlefield so that when combat does come the landscape is a
familiar rather than foreign place.204
The final and perhaps most essential component of effective control is the in-
culcation of a corporate culture on the subordinates. Cultural training helps units
achieve the highest edge of effectiveness and cohesion, but can also be a nebulous
thing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a courtroom. The commander/supe-
rior imprints an intent and vision onto the organization, as well as a corporate
consciousness of compliance. In this manner, the organization is molded on the
model provided and enforced by the leader, as well as the governing ideology that
provides cohesion in its own right. Cultural training is what happens when fighters
are not on the training field but are in their living spaces. Rarely is this formalized,
but rather it is a meeting of the minds of individuals. NRA commanders used this
aspect of training to ‘shape the expectations and behaviors of the new recruits. One
recalled that “the focus of political education was also on the building of interper-
sonal relationships”. He remembered that the commanders were trying to build a
“cohesive” group.”205 The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front was also renowned
both for its long, indoctrination-focused training and its discipline.206 When indi-
viduals form part of a group collective they necessarily sacrifice a bit of their indi-
viduality in return for identification with the group. These bonds, after they form,
are extremely difficult to break with the social or economic shocks that all fighting
organizations must endure over their existence.207
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centre of that achievement had been the army itself which had evolved from a guerrilla force into a
highly organized regular army numbering some 100,000 by the end of the war. It had been an outstand-
ing military achievement not only in African but also in international terms. As well as excelling as an
army in the field, it had developed a high degree of self-sufficiency, especially in the repair of captured
weaponry, and proved able at such disparate activities as road-building and medical services. In addi-
tion to being brave and skilled, EPLF [the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front] cadres were committed
and disciplined. Even after victory in 1991, the forces were required to remain intact and without pay
until 1995. Although there were incidents resulting from this situation, most notably in 1993, they
were defused without serious consequences. In the long term it is planned to reduce the army to 30,000,
though this also raised the problem of demobilization and subsequent employment opportunities.’
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a means of establishing effective control and transmitting expectations.’
209. For an example of this see the Regimental Commander’s comments following the US Ma-
rines killing civilians in Haditha, Iraq. ‘Simple Failures’ and ‘Disastrous Results’ Excerpts from Army
Maj. Gen. Eldon A. Bargewell’s report: Washington Post, Apr 21, 2007, A13, at <http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042002309.html>.
210. Weinstein, supra n. 185, p. 88.
211. Pool, supra n. 206, p. 32.
212. Keegan, supra n. 115, p. 50; ‘For if one once admits that the behavior of a group of soldiers
on any part of the battlefield ought to be understood in terms of their corporate mood, or of the condi-
tions there prevailing at the time, indeed in terms of anything but their willingness to do as duty,
discipline and orders demand, then the whole idea of the outcome of a battle being determined by one
commander’s defter manipulation of his masses against his opponent crumbles.’
Although this culture is derived from the tribal, religious, and societal baseline
of the fighters, it is generally an extension of the commander’s personality. The
commander determines what behavior will and will not be tolerated by subordi-
nates, and sets the standards for operationalizing the orders of superiors. The com-
mander also determines when and for what actions to reward subordinates, thereby
imposing both a personal will and a personality onto the unit. When a commander
in a speech dehumanizes the enemy, it is an implicit leadership effort interpreted
by subordinates as guidance to adapt a greater moral distance and use it to subcon-
sciously enable their killing.208 When a commander is a bigot or racist and tolerates
borderline behavior when it is executed against a group he personally dislikes, then
that behavior is implicitly tolerated and more violence will be focused against the
group.209
The group identity mechanisms do more than simply serve as the points of coa-
lescence for the unit, they also serve as to bolster all of the killing enabling mecha-
nisms. A group which has a singular culture will generally be easier to control in
combat. Peru’s Shining Path was able to wage a successful insurgency for many
years, although it eventually was defeated by the Peruvian state, because it was an
ideologically homogenous organization.210 Similarly, the EPLF were able to defeat
the Ethiopian state and overcome its inherent tribal tensions because of its cultural
training.211 Compliance to battlefield orders, especially dangerous orders, will be
higher among those units who have trust running throughout the organization.212
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This trust is achieved most easily where there is a strong group identity centered on
the culture of the group as a collective.
The development of a command climate, or corporate culture, is the essence of
effective control. The command climate is an important concept in any organiza-
tional context, but is absolutely vital in the context of fighting organizations vested
with massive violent capability which is often combined with a near-complete ab-
sence of oversight. The commander creates a culture in which subordinates know
what will and will not be tolerated, both in and out of combat. The commander’s
expectations and guidance provide the default behavioral constraints when an au-
thority figure is not in the immediate vicinity of a subordinate. The command cli-
mate habituates subordinates to loot or not, to commit personal violence against
civilians or not, to report crimes they either see or hear about or not, and a myriad
of other tasks. On a chaotic battlefield, silence is as telling as sound. This is not
only a function of subordinate initiative, but is also a function of how militaries
around the world are trained: by repetition of conduct where only the wrong is
disciplined the members learn to do what is asked of them by a lack of disciplining
rather than kind words of encouragement.
The commander ingrains the thought that subordinates can do what they like up
to the point where they are disciplined. After a unit has achieved a certain amount
of mechanical proficiency, tactical proficiency and has attained a group identity
through cultural training it is able to fight collectively on the battlefield. Yet this
training does not end once an organization enters the battlefield. The cultural and
tactical training, especially, continue throughout a fighter’s affiliation with the or-
ganization. As the organization becomes more familiar with the tactics and culture
of its enemy it may modify its own tactics and culture in some way. Even after
combat, the organization may continue to modify its tactics and culture to prepare
for the next engagement.
6.3 Mission orders and the end state
Commanders, even those who have only a few men subordinate to them, make
choices on the battlefield. It is simply impossible to control every aspect of what
every subordinate does at all times during combat. The art of commanding fighters
in battle requires knowing what to focus the commander’s mind on, what criteria
are required in order to make a tactical change, and how to make a tactical change.
If certain units are performing to the expected standards, the leader puts them out
of his mind for the time being to understand what the enemy is doing. Only if a unit
is not doing what the commander needs them is there a need to modify its behavior,
or its incentive structures. This is one reason why professionalized militaries con-
stantly train by negative reinforcement of bad behavior, while non-state armed
groups also sanction undesirable behavior using less formal, legalistic means. On
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the other hand, the general absence of reward for good behavior embeds in the
fighters an internal initiative to keep doing what they have been doing until they
are told otherwise. This only works either where the commander does not need to
(or want to) retain a high level of individual control over subordinates or where
there is a high level of trust between a commander and subordinates.
Over time, military history has shown that the best fighting organizations are
those whose subordinates are able to improvise on the battlefield, but yet do so
with an eye toward achieving the overarching goals of the campaign. This type of
order is known as an end state. A commander that wants to embrace the adage that
no plan survives first contact will simply designate to subordinates the job that is to
be done at the end of the day. A mission order is generally short, laying out what the
commander wants the end state to be and often providing the reason for that end
state. Too much specificity by a commander reduces a subordinate’s efficiency on
the battlefield because when things change on the battlefield it will take time to
report those changes to the superior and will require time to wait for the superior to
make a decision and report back to all the subordinates what he wants to happen.
Renamo was such an organization, where ‘ultimate authority for all decisions rested
with Renamo’s military commander, Aphonso Dhlakama, and his senior officers in
Gorongosa and Maringue. Commanders and combatants in Renamo did not trust
one another; the organizational structure of the movement reflected this lack of
cohesion.’213
When a commander has a high level of trust in his subordinates that confidence
may be manifested by brief orders with little or no explanatory rationale followed
by a permissive operational environment which allows the subordinates to utilize
their superior information to make achieve the commander’s end state in the opti-
mal time and manner. During the American Civil War General Ullyses S. Grant
told General Sherman ‘I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign:
but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to
execute it in your own way.’214 When the AFRC was marching towards Freetown,
Sierra Leone the central cell only designated villages that were to be targeted and
then let subordinate commanders keep their forces ‘on the right path’.215 The Sendero
Luminoso Central Committee ‘provided the overall direction of each military cam-
paign (telling militants, for example, to target government officials, to build new
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217. See supra nn. 147-150 and accompanying text.
guerrilla bases, or to increase urban actions), it was the responsibility of regional
committees to decide what actions would be taken’.216
In a culture where mission orders are the norm, tactical orders given during
combat may be rare. This is especially the case in organizations that do not have
the communications assets to be able to make tactical changes on the battlefield.
This does not mean that commanders have ceded control of their organization.
Control comes in the initial orders where the commander establishes the endstate
and articulates the reasons for that endstate. Authentic effective control, more im-
portantly, may arise from the cultural training of the organization. To a certain
extent full control of subordinates is never available to a commander. A commander
must always rely that the training and guidance prior to combat will fill the gaps
when he is not in a position to make positive directions to his subordinates. The
current jurisprudential understanding of effective control does not fully account
for the role of the commander in forming an organization, shaping its command
climate, and controlling it even in the absence of personal presence, clear commu-
nications, or even frequent contact with disparate bands of fighters operating across
geographically remote areas. The next section of this article will outline precisely
how this enforcement gap can be closed while taking into account the normative
and pragmatic reasons that superior responsibility exists at all.
7. A COMPOSITE THEORY OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
The concept of effective control should be reconceptualized by jurists to extend its
present applications by including an imputed responsibility to any commander who
organizes a collective entity with the intent of conducting hostilities and thereafter
fails to create a climate of compliance with the laws and customs of war. This
approach will permit the extension of liability to commanders who organize cellu-
lar units that operate on the basis of primary loyalty to a local leader and with little/
no tactical control by the hierarchy, such as the tactics in seen in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and a number of modern non-international armed conflicts.217
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According to the ICRC, ‘The first duty of a military commander, whatever his
rank, is to exercise command.’218 The commander/superior is the decisive actor
because inattention to the basic legal duties inherent in a hierarchy of authority
undermines the ‘very essence of the problem of enforcement of treaty rules in the
field’.219 It therefore follows that the commander be held responsible in all circum-
stances for failure to take the ‘necessary measures’ to comply with the laws and
customs of war ‘at the level of the troops’.220 Accountability of commanders, whether
they be in organized armed forces, non-state entities, or transnational organiza-
tions is essential ‘so that a fatal gap between the undertakings entered into by
Parties to the conflict and the conduct of individuals is avoided.’221 Some courts
have noted that although these doctrines are interrelated, they are distinct from one
another in that:
‘there is a difference between the concepts of responsible command and command re-
sponsibility. The difference is due to the fact that the concept of responsible command
looks to the duties comprised in the idea of command, whereas that of command re-
sponsibility looks at liability flowing from breach of those duties.’222
The Composite Theory of Command Responsibility advocated in this article pos-
tulates that it is entirely appropriate, and indeed essential, to conflate these previ-
ously distinct concepts. Though there will continue to be some instances where the
traditional principles of effective control will warrant liability when applied as a
template, the legal, practical and normative underpinnings of superior responsibil-
ity discussed above illustrate the growing gap between legal aspirations and the
actuality in juridical practice. In practice, the precepts of command/superior re-
sponsibility will atrophy as a discrete doctrine which in turn may defeat any possi-
bility of achieving hope for deterrent effects derived from the commander’s will
and authority. Jurist should be careful as a normative priority to preserve, and in-
deed revitalize, the essence of command/superior liability.
A Composite Theory of Command Responsibility would have the collateral
benefit of reinforcing a commonality of expectations by refocusing attention on
the fundamental norms of command around the world. An expanded imputation of
responsibility on those who initiate and control violence would lead to a unified
theory of command responsibility applicable to any military or paramilitary or-
ganization around the world and to any person assuming command or effectively
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operating as an authoritative commander. Such a Composite Theory would also
require reexamination of the majority holdings in Hadžihasonovi  and Ori  ap-
peals.223 On the other hand, military operations are highly sensitive to cultural
relativity, and a simplistic assessment of responsibility based on a template of tem-
poral or geographic factors falls short of capturing the essence of the real criminality.
By reconceptualizing the doctrine of effective control, jurists can close the en-
forcement gap to ensure greater compliance with the laws and customs of war by
placing criminal responsibility where it properly lies. International humanitarian
law has previously sought to maximize compliance by placing the responsibility
for the enforcement of those laws with the only actors who will be able to practi-
cally prevent their violation and enforce those laws when needed: the command-
ers. The state actors who were negotiating and furthering international humanitarian
law realized that compliance was only attainable by vesting commanders with this
responsibility and then letting them determine what disciplinary requirements would
ensure compliance. Yet, as non-state actors become increasingly common and grow
in political and military power, there seems to be a reluctance to extend the primary
enforcement responsibility to non-state actors, especially those actors who have
organized in a way unfamiliar to western jurists. In practice, superior responsibility
will atrophy as a discrete doctrine taking with it the best aspirations any deterrent
effect unless jurists revitalize its essence.
The methods an individual commander uses to enable his subordinates to kill
and uses to control the violence of his subordinates will vary depending on many
factors such as the personality of the commander, the objectives of the commander,
the culture of the society that the fighters are pulled from, the available materials
for the commander and many other factors. These requirements are absolute since
they go to the commander’s ability to field and control units conducting opera-
tions. However, the techniques for exercising control in fact vary widely across
cultures and continents, and are subject to some cultural relativity. In some con-
flicts the disciplinary system comes by taking away the spoils of a conflict, whereas
in other conflicts the disciplinary system is analogous to criminal courts through-
out the world. In some conflicts, the hierarchy is very flat and the orders process is
focused on the desired endstate, while in other conflicts the hierarchy is pyramidal
and the orders process is focused on a higher level of tactical control. Some cir-
cumstances augment the authority of a commander with tribal, religious, or famil-
ial disciplinary structures that can be molded to suit the needs of ongoing operations.
In none of these situations is there a dearth of control, it is only implemented in
different ways. Aligning effective control to these important truths should be a
simple matter if jurists and prosecutors are willing to relinquish the preconceived
niceties of past, westernized, professionalized assumptions.
223. Supra nn. 63-82 and accompanying text.
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The Composite Theory of Command Responsibility proposed herein has the
key benefit of freeing jurists from the geographic and temporal shackles that cur-
rently encumber legal analysis. An understanding of the mechanisms for how or-
ders are disseminated and what level of control is sustained by commanders is
essential, irrespective of whether they maintain tight tactical control, because the
trend is certainly towards less tactical level control by commanders and more to-
wards establishing a culture in his own image and then giving orders that will
leverage rather than stifle subordinate initiative. Indeed, the shift towards a broader
conception of effective control is a logical extension of existing doctrine because
the ‘test for effective control is not the possession of de jure authority, but rather
the material ability to prevent or punish the proven offences. Possession of de jure
authority may obviously imply such material ability, but it is neither necessary nor
sufficient to prove effective control.’224 In practice, cases such as Ori , Halilovi ,
Mpambara demonstrate that the current narrow focus on tactical control without a
broader analysis of the role of the responsible perpetrator in fielding the organiza-
tion is unduly restrictive. The relevant judicial inquiry should be whether the per-
petrator was the principal organizing factor in the onset of the pattern of criminality,
not simply whether he or she was in a position to exercise effective control at the
precise time and place of the charged offenses. Though the law is clear that mob
violence and individualized violence are beyond the reach of international humani-
tarian law,225 the current approach operates to help shield perpetrators who con-
duct hostilities using tactics that mimic chaos and random violence.
Courts should continue to enter into a subjective determination of whether there
was effective control at the time that atrocities were committed, or when notice
was received, without hewing to narrowly focused geographical and temporal limi-
tations. The Composite Theory of Command Responsibility would lead courts to
make that subjective determination in light of the the long arc of the conflict. Tri-
bunals should take into account how the fighting organization was established and
controlled by its commanders. This may not have the precision which many law-
yers would prefer because the determination must be subjective. Yet subjective
determinations are not foreign to war crimes jurisprudence, nor are they rare. The
subjective determination of how the particular atrocity committing organization
was controlled is the only way to determine whether there was effective control at
the time the atrocities were committed – or when notice was acquired by the com-
mander. Only after the court determines the particularities of how the organization
was controlled should it enter into a determination of whether there was effective
control at the time the atrocities were committed. The AFRC case was the first
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judgment to take into account this two step process. Other courts would be wise to
follow suit.
However, judges should not pinpoint the determination of whether effective
control was maintained at the time the atrocities were committed too closely. If the
organization was controlled loosely, if the training was temporally or geographi-
cally removed from the commission of the crimes, if the orders process was not
tightly controlled, in short, if the organization was shaped by a philosophy of in-
doctrination and subordinate initiative, then the wide view of control must preempt
the narrow view of control at the time of commission. Similarly, if the organization
was tightly controlled with a distinct hierarchy and leaders who maintained com-
munication up and down the chain of command throughout most of the conflict
than the narrow view of control must take precedence over the wide view of con-
trol at the time of commission. This duality is the essence of the Composite Theory
proposed in this article.
There is a distinct difference between a breakdown of control during a conflict,
and the active fielding of a unit with a systemic lack of constraining mechanisms.
This should not be confused by the courts or misconstrued in the case law. Where
a commander makes the positive decision to field an organization without the abil-
ity to suppress violations and, in turn, atrocities occur, then courts should not be
constrained from imposing criminal liability on that commander for the failure to
properly suppress violations of the laws of war. The wellspring of such criminal
culpability is the failure to responsibly carry out the quintessential duty of com-
mand – primary enforcer of the laws and customs of war. However, where the
commander has emplaced mechanisms to suppress atrocities and where there is a
complete breakdown of control then that commander has not violated that core
duty. If the court is too myopic in making the determination of effective control, it
will fail to take into account some of the most prevalent control mechanisms: the
moral enabling mechanisms and the cultural training mechanism. Both of these
mechanisms take place over the long arc, rather than happen in a moment. There is
rarely one instant where a word said by a commander to a subordinate is going to
reduce the likelihood of the subordinate committing atrocities. This type of train-
ing takes time. If a court becomes too myopic in its determination then it would be
too easy for commanders who want to commit atrocities to simply separate tempo-
rally the training (which may even encourage atrocities) from the commission of
atrocities. This temporal separation may hedge against effective control at the point
of commission and a failure to take the entire circumstances of the training of the
fighters into consideration will fail to recognize the operational realities.
This is not to say that pinpointing the operational realities at the time of the
commission is unimportant. Taking a narrow view is necessary to see whether the
commander had any ability to suppress at the time they were committed or to pun-
ish after he acquired notice. A Composite Theory embraces both the wide view of
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the conflict and the narrow view at the time of the atrocities. In the broad sense,
some authorities simply fail to act on their responsibly to serve as primary enforcer
of the laws and customs of war. However, where the commander has emplaced
mechanisms to suppress atrocities and where there is a complete breakdown of
control then that commander has not violated his duty. At first blush, this might
sound to untrained ears like a plea for strict liability against any person simply by
virtue of exercising a position of command or superior authority. Though recent
case law suggests that commanders are under a positive duty to prevent or suppress
all crimes,226 command and superior responsibility cannot be based on a strict li-
ability227 which would obviate inquiry into the relevant conduct and pertinent mens
rea by the perpetrator. 228 In fact, the current approach of the ICC as articulated in
the Lubanga decision on the confirmation of charges that conceives of the com-
mander as a ‘co-perpetrator based on joint control over the crime’229 treads peril-
ously close to strict liability while it simultaneously abandons the roots of command/
superior responsibility.
If jurists recognize the problems presented herein, there are three options: (1)
scrap the test for effective control; (2) reconceptualize the notion of superior re-
sponsibility based upon a close analysis of the mode of organization and the reality
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of operations; (3) shift the basis of responsibility squarely onto a JCE model. This
article recommends the second option. Moving completely to JCE would obfus-
cate the criminality that is most directly presented by a perpetrator who organizes
and controls individuals who subsequently commit atrocities. Abandoning the test
for effective control would negate the positive jurisprudential gains o the past dec-
ade. In any event, the caselaw has crystallized such that enervating effective con-
trol would represent a wholly unnecessary expenditure of judicial effort. What is
needed is a Composite Theory that embraces the narrow tests but also embraces
the context of criminality within which they occur. Such a Composite Theory is
situated to close the enforcement gap between state and non-state actors , and yet
requires only a short conceptual leap in the way in which jurists think about effec-
tive control.
The broadened conception of a Composite Theory is in one sense a very slight
adjustment to current practice because the terminology of effective control and the
established prongs for affixing responsibility to a particular commander remain
unchanged. There may well be cases in which the current approach is perfectly
suited to producing the correct analysis. To be clear, the current jurisprudence may
well support liability in many cases, but the Composite Theory proposed herein
would make localized findings of effective control one aspect of the larger judicial
inquiry.
On the other hand, commanders are the critical path to being able to form the
fighting organization, and their organizations will be most effective – militarily –
where they field their organization with the proper control mechanisms. A Com-
posite Theory of Responsibility represents an important shift in the current judicial
conception of effective control. The current framework should not be abandoned,
but its application should updated based on an understanding of modern conflicts.
In other words a finding that the commander/superior did not exercise effective
control over disparate forces at the precise time and place of the offenses might not
be the dispositive evidence requiring dismissal of the charges. Joseph Kony, for
example, should be accountable for the organization and fielding of the Lord’s
Resistance Army and its use on a broad campaign to terrorize civilians irrespective
of whether he had actual or constructive knowledge of particular crimes against
particular villages or whether he issued specific order to that effect.230 Such a fun-
damental shift in the thinking related to effective control would modernize the
doctrine of superior responsibility and perhaps generate some added focus on the
obligations of those most able to prevent atrocities by controlling their subordi-
nates: non-state actors pitted against each other or against state actors.
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Commanders have assumed a risk of criminal liability when they unleashed
their violence on a society, and where a superior has notice of criminal violations
and does not do everything in his power to suppress further violations or to punish
violators there must be criminal liability. This article does not propose any burden
shifting. The burden of showing that there was a fielding of an organization with-
out proper suppression mechanisms must remain fully vested with the prosecutor.
Admittedly there is a tension here. On the one hand, the prosecutor would be re-
quired to show the presence of a suppression mechanism in the overall determina-
tion, but on the other hand the prosecutor would be required to show that the suppress
mechanism was not used properly. The accused would be faced with the quandary
of which angle to challenge, since the tactics are likely mutually exclusive. The
accused could challenge the presence of the suppression mechanism, but if this
was ineffective than the court could easily determine that a suppression mecha-
nism was present but merely used improperly. Alternatively, the accused could
challenge that he used the suppression mechanism properly but that there was a
breakdown of control which enabled the atrocities to be committed.
8. CONCLUSION
Since commanders are the critical path to enabling the organization to fight collec-
tively they – logically – must be the critical path to controlling and focusing the
violence which they alone are responsible for releasing onto the battlefield. At
present, there is a legal disconnect that threatens to render the doctrine of com-
mand responsibility obsolete in the modern era of non-state, decentralized partici-
pants in conflict. As Elie Wiesel observed, ‘[A] destruction that only man can
provoke, only man can prevent.’231 Above all, this central truth warrants the legal
conclusion that because international law entrusts commanders as the primary en-
forcement mechanism for the laws and customs of war, any commander in any
conflict under any form of organization who fields a fighting force assumes the
risk of criminality if he does not properly emplace mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance with the laws and customs of warfare. As one World War I era commander
observed: ‘If you start a man killing, you can’t turn him off again like an engine.
After all, he is a good man. He was probably half off his head.’232 It is commanders
who are responsible for turning this engine on, and it is commanders who are re-
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sponsible for focusing the violence of their subordinates. Commanders are hu-
manity’s best hope of constraining the momentum of conflict to a focused violence
pinpointed on accomplishing the mission which the individual commander was
given rather than on a generalized violence which perpetrates crimes and does
little to accomplish a specific mission with a specific military objective.
This article closes with a plea to jurists. Those commanders who hold them-
selves out as military commanders must be held to the standards that international
law places on all military commanders to suppress atrocities. Those commanders
who field fighting organizations without the proper methods for enforcing compli-
ance with the laws and wars assume the risk of criminal sanction where criminal
violations occur by their subordinates. A close look at how commanders field or-
ganizations, how they train their organizations and how they plan and conduct
operations on the battlefield shows that in complex operations, and almost every
atrocity, the commander assumes the risk of personal responsibility as a concurrent
aspect of commencing violent activities.
Any armed conflict represents a complex commingling of human factors: poli-
tics, personalities, men and women struggling to survive amidst incredible hard-
ships, the face of an uncertain future, the competition between personal honor and
fear, the conflict between courage and common sense, anxiety interspersed with
exhilaration, fatigue, elation, catharsis, compassion. The leaders responsible for
unleashing the waves of violence that destroy lives and threaten to destroy social
and family structures represent the thread binding these diverse factors. The perva-
sive, sustained, violent nature of war crimes, crimes against humanity and geno-
cide is different than the crimes of normal civil society. These crimes are much
different psychologically, practically and sociologically than other crimes and an
effective vetting of the facts is only attainable by those litigators and judges who
understand the operational realities of those who commit them. The alternative is
to extrapolate current trends and anticipate additional acquittals in the future of
those perpetrators clever or lucky enough to exploit the lacunae in current case
law.
ABSTRACT
Commanders are the critical path enabling the formation and employment of any
fighting organization. By extension, their units are most militarily effective where
they are governed by adequate control mechanisms. The classic doctrine of com-
mand responsibility that imputes the criminality of subordinates onto their leaders
is founded on the legal premise that commanders are responsible for establishing
affirmative controls over their subordinates to regulate their conduct. The com-
mander is thereby criminally culpable for failing to create a climate of compliance
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with the laws and customs of war. The obligation of commanders to control the
conduct of their subordinates, or to take action to ameliorate violations when they
do occur, applies to both formalized regular military organizations and the loosely
structured non-state entities that are common in modern conflicts. Current legal
tests for evaluating such ‘effective control’ inaccurately reflect modern operational
reality by narrowly focusing on the particular circumstances of the criminal act
and the precise relationship between the perpetrators and the superior at the mo-
ment of the offense. However, courts have developed and applied a series of tests
for evaluating ‘effective control’ that in practice become formulaic and limiting.
This trend is exacerbated when applied to warlords or non-state actors in non-
hierarchical organizations.
Command responsibility has deep historical roots that transcend culture and
geography, indicating a timeless consensus that commanders bear personal and
professional responsibility for the acts of their subordinates regardless of the con-
text in which they occur. International law subsequently developed to place a height-
ened responsibility on commanders who field a fighting organization and control
the application of violence by their subordinates. Without the proper internal en-
forcement of the laws and customs of warfare, the commander becomes liable to
external criminal enforcement, directed towards both the subordinates and the
commander. Prosecutorial trends toward charging joint criminal enterprises and
other new theories of individual responsibility fail to understand the essence of the
criminality at issue for all fighting organizations – that it is the fielding of the
fighting organization without the proper safeguards that in many cases is the causal
factor for mass atrocities. Is the law presently configured such that a rebel war-
lord, a terrorist leader or an outsourced intelligence operator may evade superior
responsibility simply because of the unorthodox structure of the fighting organiza-
tion or the disaggregated orchestration of violence?
If the theory of effective control is not reconceived, the answer will be yes, and
increasingly so. It is perhaps inevitable that the changing face of warfare requires
a modernized conception of effective control. The concept of effective control should
be reconceptualized by jurists to extend its present applications by including an
imputed responsibility to any commander or non-state actor assuming that role
who organizes a collective entity with the intent of conducting hostilities and there-
after fails to create a climate of compliance with the laws and customs of war. This
approach will permit the extension of liability to commanders who organize cellu-
lar units that operate on the basis of primary loyalty to a local leader and with
little/no tactical control by the hierarchy, such as the tactics seen in Iraq, Afghani-
stan, and a number of modern non-international armed conflicts.
Jurists should analyze superior responsibility cases with full cognizance of
modern command and control theory in order to sustain its viability as a practical
prosecutorial tool to regulate the crimes committed by loosely knit groups and
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non-state actors conducting atrocities in chaotic circumstances. A reconceived
theory of effective control would retain the current indicia developed by jurists,
which are most often applicable to state actors and formalized military hierar-
chies. To be clear, the current jurisprudence may well support liability in many
cases, but the Composite Theory proposed herein would make localized findings of
effective control one aspect of the larger judicial inquiry. A Composite Theory of
Responsibility would revitalize and modernize the doctrine of superior responsi-
bility and avoid impunity for those perpetrators clever or lucky enough to exploit
the lacunae in current case law.
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